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Reviews of American Sämoa, Hawai‘i, 
Niue, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
Wallis and Futuna are not included in 
this issue.
Cook Islands
Issues in the Cook Islands during the 
period under review highlight contro-
versial government decisions as well as 
some notable judicial and parliamen-
tary amendments. Government indif-
ference to voter concerns was refl ected 
in confl icts at Aitutaki and Manihiki 
airports, a drawn out debate over an 
indoor stadium for the country, the 
sudden discontinuation of the vaka 
(district) council, unfair cost-of- living 
adjustments (cola), and even a chal-
lenge from the traditional leadership 
in the House of Ariki. This review 
underlines the growing disconnect 
between the Cook Islands government 
and Cook Islanders, and the margin-
alization of Cook Islands Mäori and 
their paramount chiefs.
The loss of one of the greatest sons 
of the Cook Islands was a sad event 
for all Cook Islanders. Dr Thomas 
Robert Alexander Harries Davis kbe 
(1917–2007), former prime minister 
of the Cook Islands and a United 
States Apollo Space Program scientist, 
passed away on 23 July 2007 (CIN, 24 
July 2007, 1, 5). He was a well-known 
medical doctor, scientist, statesman, 
author, voyager, and Pacifi c politi-
cian, who played a major role in the 
formation of the East-West Center’s 
Pacifi c Islands Development Program 
in Hawai‘i (CIN, 28 July 2007, 5). 
Hundreds attended his state funeral on 
27 July at the Are Kari Oi Nui (CIN, 
30 July 2007, 1). 
Landowners of two outer-island 
airports were dissatisfi ed with the 
government. At one point Manihiki 
Airport landowners, angry about 
lease terms, initiated a forced airport 
closure by spreading debris over the 
runway to render it unusable (CIN, 5 
July 2007, 1). They later agreed to 
a new lease arrangement for sixty 
acres of land at an estimated value of 
nz$200 per acre (CIN, 1 Feb 2008, 1). 
(One nz dollar was the equivalent of 
us$.69 as of August 2008.) Despite 
the agreement, a fl ight to Manihiki 
was turned back by some disgruntled 
Manihiki airport landowners (CIN, 14 
May 2008, 1). A police patrol boat 
was required to help keep the peace 
(CIN, 16 May 2008, 1). 
Confl ict at the Aitutaki airport 
focused on the desire of local residents 
to keep the Sabbath holy (CIN, 12 
June 2008, 1). About 300 protestors 
strongly, yet peacefully, expressed their 
displeasure at government-sponsored 
efforts to land planes on the island 
on Sundays (CIN, 23 June 2008, 1). 
The peaceful demonstration was in 
contrast to previous occasions when 
debris was spread on the runway. 
In recognition of continuing high 
 emotions, the government agreed to 
a six-month trial period, although 
expressions of resistance to Sunday 
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landings continue (CIH, 28 June 2008, 
2). 
The courts were busy this year 
beginning with what is believed to be 
the fi rst successful defamation case 
in the Cook Islands. The case was 
successfully argued by lawyer Charles 
Little for William Framhein against 
property developer Tim Tepaki (CIN, 
2 July 2007, 1). The judge awarded 
nz$90,000 to Framhein. Prominent 
businessman Richard Barton was 
convicted on fi ve charges of will-
fully fi ling false income tax returns 
and fi ned (CIN, 10 Nov 2007, 1). The 
American owners of the South Pacifi c 
School of Medicine indicated that they 
plan to take the government to court 
for reneging on a contract to open 
a school in the Cook Islands (CIN, 
12 June 2008, 1). Meanwhile, Vai 
Peua, the member of Parliament for 
Pukapuka Island, criticized the Cook 
Islands High Court and Justice System 
for sending criminals to the outer 
islands to serve out their sentences. 
He also lashed out at the police for 
failing to monitor a criminal who shot 
three people on his island (CIN, 31 July 
2007, 1).
The tourism industry faced both 
challenges and opportunities. Cook 
Islands Tourism Corporation chief 
executive Chris Wong resigned after 
pressure from various sectors of the 
public for alleged fi nancial discrepan-
cies (CIN, 28 July 2007, 1). John Dean 
was selected to succeed Wong (CIN, 20 
Feb 2008, 1) and now faces several 
major challenges in maintaining 
tourism as the country’s major indus-
try. The Asian Development Bank 
outlook highlighted the vulnerability 
of the tourism industry in the Cook 
Islands, with its inadequate and aging 
infrastructure. Aggressive approaches 
by some local operators proved 
counterproductive. The Rarotonga 
Beach Resort, for example, gener-
ated some negative publicity when it 
charged a man nz$100 for using its 
beachfront (CIN, 18 Sept 2007, 1). 
The Crown Law Offi ce contributed 
to the debate by pointing out that the 
resort’s property ended at the high-
water mark, which can be diffi cult to 
defi ne because of erosion, rising sea 
level, or land reclamation (CIN,21 Sept 
2007, 1).
In spite of these challenges, the high 
standards maintained by some opera-
tors attracted global attention. At the 
World Travel Awards held in Sydney 
on 10 June 2008, the Cook Islands 
received several prestigious accolades. 
Additionally a proposed new Kia 
Orana Air group sought an operating 
license so that it could compete against 
the successful Air Raro (CIN, 6 May 
2008, 1). However, rising fuel costs 
will be a major challenge for the new 
airline. For example, one-way fares on 
Air Raro from Rarotonga to Manihiki 
went up during the year from nz$682 
to nz$1150, an increase of 69 percent 
(CIN, 17 Oct 2007, 1). 
Development needs also extend 
to health. In a report presented to a 
Cook Islands health conference, Dr 
Kevin Palmer of the World Health 
Organization indicated that the coun-
try was in dire need of more health 
personnel. However, Dr Palmer also 
horrifi ed many local residents when he 
declared that Reslin spraying was one 
of the safest insecticides in the world, 
and recommended the use of ddt, 
a substance that is banned in many 
countries (CIN, 13 July 2007, 1).
The shipping issue continues to 
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heat up in Parliament and, in spite 
of the public uproar, the government 
has reportedly incorporated a con-
tingency budget allocation for the 
purchase of a ship (CIN, 12 Feb 2008, 
1). Express Cook Islands Line had 
sought approval for a ten-year ship-
ping license to enable it to build a new 
114-meter-long cargo ship to service 
the country. The government now 
faces the need to upgrade the harbor, 
which cannot accommodate ships this 
long, and remove the current two-year 
license restriction (CIN, 5 March 2008, 
1). By March 2008, a nz$6 million 
harbor extension was being imple-
mented (CIN, 7 March 2008, 1).
In the fi shing area, a two- member 
team from Greenpeace, Nilesh 
 Goundar and Sari Tolvanen, visited 
the Cook Islands to lobby for a sus-
tainable and equitable Pacifi c fi shery 
(CIN, 17 July 2007, 7). Prime Minister 
Jim Marurai agreed to champion the 
campaign to save the Pacifi c tuna (CIN, 
18 July 2007, 1). Several troubling 
incidences occurred within Cook 
Islands waters. Two Koreans and a 
Vietnamese employed on the fi shing 
vessel fv Matira were left stranded 
on Rarotonga for three months when 
the shipowner refused to pay their 
salaries, accusing the men of damaging 
his vessel (CIN, 18 July 2007, 1). The 
Korean Embassy in Wellington was 
drawn into the matter, and fi ghting 
between the Korean and Vietnamese 
crewman further complicated commu-
nication diffi culties (CIN, 9 Aug 2007, 
1; 10 Aug 2007, 1). In September, the 
fv Moana sank in rough seas forty 
kilometers off Rarotonga, although 
the three Fijian crewmen were rescued 
(CIN, Sept 2007, 1). In early 2008, 
Tapi Taio’s cargo ship mv Maungaroa 
was washed up on Avatiu harbor and 
then his fv Ana was grounded on the 
reef two months later (CIN, 17 March 
2008, 1). Fortunately, fv Ana was suc-
cessfully and safely removed (CIN, 19 
March 2008, 1). However, the wreck-
age of mv Maungaroa remains on the 
Avatiu reef (CIN, 2 April 2008, 1).
At one point, controversy erupted 
over government plans to scuttle the 
derelict mv Mataora seven miles off 
Rarotonga, fully laden with asbestos 
waste (CIN, 29 Oct 2007, 1). Locals 
were disturbed by the government’s 
secrecy and rushed approach to the 
dumping, and called on Greenpeace 
to intervene (CIN, 29 Oct 2007, 1). 
Despite the protests, and although bad 
weather interceded, the sinking was 
eventually carried out (CIN, 3 Nov 
2007, 1). 
Continuing its support of various 
Cook Islands development projects, 
China loaned nz$9.3 million to assist 
in the construction of an indoor 
stadium and the relocation of the 
Ministry of Education offi ces. Foreign 
Affairs Minister Wilkie Rasmussen 
initially questioned some of Deputy 
Prime Minister Dr Terepai Maoate’s 
statements about the China loan, 
suggesting that Maoate should have 
walked away from it (CIN, 30 Aug 
2007, 1). The confl ict escalated when 
Rasmussen threatened to push to 
remove Maoate from the cabinet (CIN, 
3 Sept 2007, 1). Prime Minster Jim 
Marurai shied away from the public 
spat between his two ministers, prefer-
ring to deal with it “in house” (CIN, 7 
Sept 2007, 1). Meanwhile the Cham-
ber of Commerce weighed in request-
ing more discussion of the indoor 
 stadium contract, and mounting public 
opposition forced the government to 
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place the project on hold (CIN, 7 Sept 
2007, 1; 11 Sept 2007, 1). By October 
2007, the cabinet fi nally approved 
the new indoor sports stadium for 
the 2009 Pacifi c Mini Games. The 
expected grant from China would go 
toward the cost of constructing the 
stadium, but the source of funding for 
the hosting of the mini games, esti-
mated at nz$2.715 million, was still 
unclear (CIN, 25 Oct 2007, 1). The 
government later sought to increase 
the amount of the soft loan from 
China to nz$13 million (CIN, 16 Feb 
2008, 1). 
Mini games ceo David Lobb 
expressed outrage that the planned 
sports complex had not been fully 
discussed with the local sports com-
munity, and his criticism received 
support from Cook Islands National 
Olympic Committee President Tiki 
Matapo (CIN, 16 Feb 2008, 1; 22 Feb 
2008, 1). The government’s indecision 
over the hosting of the world youth 
netball championship also caused 
anxiety among sports organizers (CIN, 
5 March 2008, 1). Amid public criti-
cism, the prime minister reconfi rmed 
that the government will deliver on the 
sports facility (CIN, 6 March 2008, 1; 
8 March 2008, 1). The International 
Netball Federation board subse-
quently reaffi rmed the Cook Islands 
as the host for the 2008 World Youth 
Netball Tournament (CIN, 8 April 
2008, 1).
The projects sank further into 
confl ict when the Chamber of Com-
merce renewed its demands that the 
government stop the multimillion-dol-
lar China loan and abandon plans for 
the indoor sports complex (CIN, 25 
Feb 2008, 1). The Chinese government 
expressed concern about the negative 
public comments and indicated that 
the soft loan might be withdrawn (CIN, 
30 April 2008, 1; 7 May 2008, 1). The 
government revitalized its commit-
ment to the loan but promised that 50 
percent of the money will be given to 
local contractors. At the close of the 
year in review the loan was fi nalized 
(but not signed), and contracts to con-
struct the stadium were in place.
While open public confl ict over 
the national stadium continued, the 
University of the South Pacifi c–Cook 
Islands committee suggested that the 
proposed Pacifi c studies campus on 
Rarotonga was far more important 
than the stadium. A sixty-year lease 
for fi fteen acres of land had already 
been approved for such a campus, but 
planning was delayed pending a more 
positive government response (CIN, 
5 Sept 2007, 1). 
A major issue throughout the 
year was the cost of living adjust-
ment (cola) for Cook Islands public 
servants. President of the Cook Islands 
Workers Association Anthony Turua 
was critical of how the politicians’ 
4 percent cola was quickly approved, 
backdated, and paid out, while public 
servants had to wait (CIN, 9 July 2007, 
1). The opposition members of Parlia-
ment joined the censure by question-
ing the government’s mishandling of 
budgeting and payouts (CIN, 11 July 
2007, 1). The Workers Association 
opted to go to court over the cola 
issue, with Turua pointing to increases 
in fuel prices, power and phone 
bills, freight costs, and a 100 percent 
markup on the cost of commodities. 
He also highlighted the fact that cola 
had been ignored since 2001 (CIN, 14 
Sept 2007, 1). In October, the cabinet 
agreed to a limited 4 percent cola 
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payout, but union members said that 
the decision fell short of what had 
already been approved for public ser-
vants (CIN, 18 Oct 2007, 1). Also, the 
proposed payout was not backdated 
as it had been for politicians (CIN, 19 
Oct 2007, 1). Opposition spokesman 
Norman George agreed with the pub-
lic servants and criticized the govern-
ment for its mishandling of the cola 
and sports stadium issues (CIN, 24 Oct 
2007, 1). 
As the cola debate continued, new 
salaries for heads of ministries were 
recommended (CIN, 18 Feb 2008, 1). 
Unlike public servants, “secret” pay 
increases for members of Parliament 
were reportedly approved. The prime 
minister received an increase from 
nz$75,000 to nz$105,000, and the 
mp base salary was increased from 
nz$35,000 to nz$50,000 (CIN, 7 
June 2008, 1). Subsequently, it was 
revealed that the fi nance secretary was 
to receive nz$120,000 per year (CIN, 
8 June 2008, 1). The salary review 
for other heads of ministries fi nally 
established top salaries at nz$75,000 
plus per annum (CIN, 9 June 2008, 1; 
14 June 2008, 1). 
There was also controversy when 
the government suddenly abolished 
the Rarotonga Island’s Vaka Council, 
which was scheduled to cease operat-
ing by February 2008. Minister of 
Internal Affairs Ngamau Munokoa 
explained that the locally elected 
Vaka Council was not maintaining 
the upkeep of community roadsides, 
road drainage systems, and streams. 
Council mayors challenged Munokoa’s 
reasoning and pointed out that they 
had accomplished much more than 
their budget allocation called for, and 
that mayors had always received sup-
port from the communities they served 
(CIN, 10 Oct 2007 1).
Relationships with the House of 
Ariki also plagued the government 
during 2007–2008. Established in 
1967, the House of Ariki has become 
an important and recognized voice 
on traditional culture and land issues 
(CIN, 26 July 2007, 5). However, the 
institution has been marginalized by 
the government and maintains merely 
an advisory role with no real powers. 
This may have made Ariki leaders vul-
nerable to outsiders who come in with 
promises of respect as well as support 
for land control and cultural integrity. 
Bruce Ruatapu Mita, an eloquent 
Australia-based New Zealand Mäori 
with an appreciation of traditional 
leadership, exploited this vulnerability. 
While the government quickly labeled 
Mita as a scam artist seeking seabed 
mineral rights, Mita organized secret 
meetings with traditional chiefs and 
convinced many to follow his advice 
(CIN, 2 May 2008, 1; 30 May 2008, 
1). Calling themselves Te Ui Ariki 
Ngateitei O Te Kuki Airani, several of 
the country’s paramount chiefs signed 
a proclamation declaring that they 
no longer recognized the government, 
Parliament, the Crown, and ties to 
the British queen, and that the coun-
try’s natural land and sea resources 
belonged to them. Spokesmen Vakatini 
Ariki and Vaeruarangi Teaukura Ariki 
publicly read the proclamation, stating 
that now was the time to rid the coun-
try of government politics, which had 
marginalized and ignored traditional 
leaders. 
The prime minister turned down 
a request by Vakatini Makea Ariki 
to meet, and Deputy Prime Minister 
Terepai Maoate suggested that the Ui 
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Ariki proclamation appeared to be 
treasonous (CIN, 12 June 2008, 1; 13 
June 2008, 1). After pressure from 
the government, the House of Ariki 
reaffi rmed their support of the queen 
as head of state. Opposition members 
also urged the government to refrain 
from legal or negative responses, and 
to respect the basis of the concerns 
expressed by the paramount chiefs.
Bruce Mita was not the only person 
to show interest in seabed mining 
(CIN, 29 April 2008, 1). US Ambas-
sador William F McCormick met with 
Maoate and expressed interest in a 
joint US–Cook Islands exploration 
of the manganese nodule in the Cook 
Islands exclusive economic zone (CIN, 
10 Nov 2007, 1). A Canadian mer-
chant bank also sought access to the 
Cook Islands seabed minerals, describ-
ing them as being worth billions (CIN, 
20 Nov 2007, 1). 
Maoate agreed to reinstate the nod-
ule advisory committee and alluded to 
ongoing discussions with the Norwe-
gian government, International Finan-
cial Corporation, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, and Asian Development 
Bank (CIN, 17 April 2008, 1). When 
the opposition boycotted the nodule 
committee, its leader, Tom Marsters, 
explained that seabed mining “is the 
future of the Cook Islands” and that 
the government should leave it to the 
professionals (CIN, 18 April 2008, 1). 
Instead of a committee, the opposi-
tion recommended that the prime 
minister create a nodules portfolio 
(CIN, 23 April 2008, 1). The World 
Bank offered to provide support for 
development of the country’s seabed 
resource in the most environmentally 
sustainable and fi nancially secure 
manner (CIN, 28 April 2008, 1). 
The export of fresh maile lei 
(garland made from the leaves of the 
fragrant maile vine) from the Cook 
Islands to Hawai‘i was seriously and 
abruptly affected by the shutdown 
of Aloha Airlines, which prevented 
the shipment of thousands of dollars 
worth of the plants (CIN, 2 May 2008, 
1). On a more positive note, the anz 
Bank opened a solar-powered branch 
in Aitutaki Island, a fi rst in the 
Pacifi c. The forty-eight solar panels 
produce 12,000 kilowatt-hours of 
electricity per year (CIN, 25 Oct 
2007, 1).
Perhaps the most tragic develop-
ment for the Cook Islands occurred 
on the road, with seven accidental 
deaths in twelve months. Rarotonga’s 
per capita death toll from traffi c 
accidents is the highest in the world 
(CIN, 10 Aug 2007, 1). Recognizing 
the seriousness of the situation, the 
government pushed for an  amendment 
to the Transport Act 1967. It sought 
to change the speed limit,  introduce 
immediate fi nes, and require motor-
cycle riders to wear helmets. The 
amendment called for jail terms and 
heavy fi nes for reckless driving that 
results in bodily harm (CIN, 15 Sept 
2007, 1). After public consultations, 
the amendment was refi ned, and the 
speed limit on the island of Raro-
tonga was reduced from sixty to fi fty 
kilometers per hour (ie, thirty-seven 
to thirty-one miles per hour). Exceed-
ing the speed limit would result in 
fi nes up to nz$250 (CIN, 27 Oct 
2007, 1). A petition against motorcy-
clists being required to wear helmets 
emerged, with the anti-helmet group 
arguing that the headgear should not 
be mandatory (CIN, 26 March 2008, 
1; 3 April 2008, 1). Bowing to pres-
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sure, the government scrapped the 
compulsory helmet law, inadvertently 
leaving some retail shops stuck with 
pre ordered supplies of helmets (CIN, 4 
April 2008, 1). Police also began using 
laser guns to catch speeding drivers 
(CIN, 16 April 2008, 1).
In the 2007–2008 period, the Cook 
Islands Parliament passed an electoral 
amendment act that clearly defi nes 
the process by which a prime minister 
may be removed from offi ce, either by 
the defeat of an annual appropriations 
budget, or a vote of no confi dence. 
The act also forces members to vote 
according to party lines or automati-
cally lose their seats. This part of the 
act attempts to prevent the party 
hopping that has led to the formation 
of new governments outside of Parlia-
ment (CIN, 11 Aug 2007, 1). 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Edwin 
Pitman resigned from his post after 
fi fteen years of service (CIN, 14 Nov 
2007, 1). To the surprise of many, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Wilkie 
Rasmussen selected fellow lawyer and 
former British honorary representa-
tive Mike Mitchell to succeed Pitman 
(CIN, 16 Jan 2008, 1). Public criticism 
emerged over the appointment because 
Mitchell is only a permanent resident, 
not a Cook Islander (CIN, 17 Jan 
2008, 4). This was especially troubling 
as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is responsible for immigration, and 
controls the process for issuing perma-
nent-resident status. It was noted that 
Mitchell’s expertise lay in areas other 
than foreign affairs, and Cook Island-
ers were insulted that qualifi ed local 
candidates were not considered (CIN, 
19 Jan 2008, 1, 4). Mitchell reviewed 
the Cook Islands’ overseas offi ces, and 
after determining that the consulate in 
Hawai‘i was no longer justifi ed, it was 
closed (CIN, 1 March 2008, 1).
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French Polynesia
With three changes of governments, 
political instability in French Poly-
nesia increased further during the 
period under review. Reform of the 
country’s political system and fresh 
elections, both unilaterally imposed 
by Paris, served to further aggravate 
the situation. Meanwhile, the local 
political scene was being reconfi gured, 
with once staunchly pro-French leader 
 Gaston Flosse allying himself with 
his pro-independence archrival Oscar 
Temaru, while many of Flosse’s former 
allies formed a heterogeneous pro-
French coalition under Gaston Tong 
Sang.
In mid-July, the governing pro-
French coalition under President Tong 
Sang, formed in late December 2006 
out of Flosse’s Tahoeraa Huiraatira 
(People’s Rally) party and several 
splinter groups opposed to the previ-
ous pro-independence president, Oscar 
Temaru, broke apart after barely 
six months in existence. An internal 
power struggle between Flosse and 
Tong Sang had been going on for 
several months, but it escalated dur-
ing Tong Sang’s visit to Paris in early 
July. Tong Sang and his delegation 
met French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
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and negotiated contracts with several 
French ministries (NT, 10 July 2008). 
However, assembly Speaker Edouard 
Fritch, Flosse’s son-in-law, and other 
leading Tahoeraa members were not 
part of the delegation and complained 
about the lack of discussion about the 
contracts in the assembly before the 
trip (NT, 7 July 2007; TPM, Aug 2007). 
As a result, shortly after Tong 
Sang’s return from Paris, the fi ve 
 Tahoeraa ministers in Tong Sang’s 
cabinet resigned, and the party 
decided to withdraw from the coali-
tion, leaving Tong Sang and his 
remaining coalition partners in a 
minority position (DT, 19 July 2007). 
One day later, Flosse announced 
that he had had talks with opposition 
leader Temaru and was ready to form 
a new governing coalition (DT, 20 
July 2007). He advocated a reconcili-
ation of the two historically opposed 
political blocks, and an agreement to 
respect each other’s political convic-
tions and work for the common good 
(NT, 21 July 2007). When French 
Secretary of State for Overseas Ter-
ritories Christian Estrosi criticized 
the proposal, Flosse accused him of 
having a colonialist attitude (NT, 23 
July 2007). In an extraordinary party 
convention on 25 July, Tahoeraa 
approved the withdrawal from Tong 
Sang’s government and the negotia-
tions with Temaru. However, Flosse 
had insisted on an open vote instead 
of a secret ballot (DT, 26 July 2007). 
Subsequently, the party encountered 
many problems with dissidents who 
deserted to Tong Sang, thus weakening 
Flosse’s position (TPM, Oct 2007).
Flosse’s maneuver surprised many 
observers, but it can be explained in 
terms of the changing political land-
scape in Paris. Since Sarkozy took over 
the presidency from Jacques Chirac 
in May, the latter’s close friend Flosse 
no longer receives special support 
from Paris. Instead, Sarkozy has made 
his preference for Tong Sang quite 
obvious. As he demonstrated earlier 
in his career, Flosse is much more a 
power politician than an ideologue (he 
changed from an apologist of authori-
tarian colonial rule to an ardent sup-
porter of local autonomy in the early 
1980s). He was ready to ally with 
the pro-independence camp in order 
to undermine the new Sarkozy–Tong 
Sang axis and keep himself in a posi-
tion of power.
After Tong Sang’s attempts in 
consultations with Tahoeraa lead-
ers to save his minority government 
failed, Temaru’s upld (Union for 
Democracy) coalition fi led a motion of 
censure against the government. This 
was adopted by the assembly on 31 
August with an ample majority of 35 
votes, combining those of upld with 
those of Tahoeraa (TPM, Sept 2007). 
Tong Sang had attempted to delay 
his overthrow by fi ling a procedural 
complaint, and on 8 September about 
2,500 people marched through the 
streets of Papeete in support of the 
ousted president (DT, 9 Sept 2007). 
However, the show of force was to no 
avail (TPM, Sept 2007).
For the election of a new president 
on 13 September, Tahoeraa came up 
with a new twist. It denied any alli-
ance with the upld and presented 
Edouard Fritch as its own candidate 
to run against Temaru and Tong Sang. 
As none of them could receive the 
overall majority required to be elected, 
Flosse’s strategy was apparently to 
force a second round of voting, in 
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which he hoped Tong Sang’s support-
ers would vote for Fritch because 
of their ideological opposition to 
Temaru. However, two days before 
the election, the French Council of 
State (the highest administrative court) 
decided that a relative majority would 
be suffi cient in the second round of 
voting. Temaru was elected president 
once more with a relative majority of 
26 votes, and in his inaugural speech 
he thanked Flosse for his indirect sup-
port (DT, 12 Sept 2007; NT, 12 Sept 
2007; DT, 14 Sept 2007; TPM, Oct 
2007). 
On 18 September, Temaru pre-
sented his new cabinet of sixteen min-
isters, almost identical to that  during 
his previous term. The only new faces 
were former assembly Speaker Antony 
Geros as vice president instead of 
Jacqui Drollet, and pearl dealer Marc 
Collins as minister of tourism (DT, 19 
Sept 2007; NT, 19 Sept 2007; TPM, Oct 
2007). Tahoeraa refused to participate 
in the government, but agreed not to 
fi le a motion of censure against Tema-
ru’s minority government and cooper-
ate with the upld in the assembly.
The change of government cast 
a cloud over the meeting of Pacifi c 
Islands royal families on Marae 
Taputapuatea on the island of Raiatea 
from 12 to 14 September. The meeting 
was organized by the royal custom-
ary council association Na Huiarii 
Mata Ara e Pae under the leadership 
of Tahitian royal family descendant 
Joinville Pomare and with the sup-
port of the Tong Sang government. 
The organizers hoped to reunite all 
the chiefl y families of Polynesia on the 
famed marae (ancient temple), which 
was the spiritual and political center 
of Eastern Polynesia until about 600 
years ago, and from which ancient 
voyages of exploration departed for 
destinations as distant as New Zea-
land and Hawai‘i. The guests included 
Mäori King Tuheitia, Paramount Chief 
Tumu Te Heuheu of Ngäti Tüwhare-
toa (who was also Chairperson of the 
unesco world heritage committee); 
the president of the Cook Islands’ 
House of Ariki, Ada Rongomatane 
Ariki; several other Cook Islands 
high chiefs and the country’s prime 
minister, Jim Marurai; Princess Malia 
Kulimoetoke of Uvea (Wallis); a chief 
from Futuna; a delegation of chiefl y 
descendants from Rapa Nui; and a 
chiefl y descendant from Hawai‘i. Also 
present were two Kanak chiefs from 
the Customary Senate of New Caledo-
nia. During the three-day meeting, the 
delegates discussed the role of tradi-
tional leaders in the contemporary 
Pacifi c, and signed a declaration to 
commit themselves to the preservation 
of the cultural heritage of Polynesia. 
In the presence of unesco offi cial Te 
Heuheu, the participants also sup-
ported listing Marae Taputapuatea as 
a world heritage site (DT, 11, 13, 15 
Sept 2007; TPM, Oct 2007). 
Invitees from Sämoa and Tonga, 
on the other hand, cancelled their 
already confi rmed participation at the 
last minute after receiving a diplo-
matic note cosigned by Gaston Flosse 
and Oscar Temaru urging them not 
to attend the meeting because of the 
ongoing change of government (TP, 
6 Sept 2007). The two leaders appar-
ently feared that the meeting, spon-
sored by Tong Sang, could give the 
latter an unintended boost by raising 
his profi le among Pacifi c Islands lead-
ers. Temaru initially refused to hold 
the reception for the chiefl y guests 
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scheduled by Tong Sang in the Papeete 
presidential palace. After some nego-
tiations, the reception did fi nally take 
place in a lukewarm atmosphere. 
Temaru and Pomare, both long 
time pro-independence leaders, have 
strong disagreements on the political 
shape the future independent country 
might take. While Temaru favors a 
system of Western-style democracy, 
Pomare advocates the restoration of 
a political role for traditional leaders, 
as well as the re-creation of customary 
land tribunals. Because of these and 
other disagreements, Pomare has allied 
himself with Tong Sang and other pro-
French politicians. 
Since Tong Sang was ousted by 
his own party, it was not surprising 
that soon after the consolidation of 
the new Tahoeraa-tolerated Temaru 
minority government, he formally 
resigned his Tahoeraa membership and 
founded his own party on 28 Sep-
tember. It was named O Porinetia To 
Tatou Ai‘a (Polynesia Is Our Country), 
and consisted of Tahoeraa dissidents 
mainly from the Leeward Islands, as 
well as a few veteran politicians with 
other affi liations (TP, 28 Sept 2007). 
On 11 October, Tong Sang signed a 
partnership agreement with former 
Temaru ally Emile Vernaudon’s Ai‘a 
Api (New Homeland) party, Philip 
Schyle’s formerly centrist Fetia Api 
(New Star), and several small pro-
French splinter parties under the 
umbrella name of To Tatou Ai‘a (Our 
Land) (TPM, Nov 2007). After some 
hesitation, the alliance was also joined 
on 27 November by Jean-Christophe 
Bouissou’s Rautahi (Unity) party, 
another, earlier Tahoeraa dissident 
group.
Meanwhile, in reaction to the 
constant political instability, the 
French government revised the politi-
cal statute governing the territory. On 
1 August, Secretary of State Estrosi 
announced that his offi ce was prepar-
ing this, and anticipated elections 
in early 2008 (TPM, Sept 2007). He 
consulted various local political lead-
ers during the two following months, 
receiving mixed reactions. Tong Sang 
and his allied splinter parties sup-
ported Estrosi’s proposal, while the 
two large parties, Tahoeraa and upld, 
declined. In order to create more 
stable majorities, the revision included 
a new voting system for the assem-
bly of French Polynesia, which in the 
future will be elected through a pro-
portional system in two rounds of vot-
ing. Only lists that receive more than 
12.5 percent in the fi rst round can 
participate in the runoff ballot, and 
lists that receive more than 5 percent 
are allowed to merge with one of the 
larger lists. In addition, the president 
of French Polynesia can no longer be 
overthrown in a motion of censure, 
but only in a “motion of defi ance,” 
which means the simultaneous elec-
tion of a successor. The Speaker of the 
assembly, whose yearly reelection had 
caused political turmoil in the past, 
will in the future be elected only once 
for the full fi ve-year legislative term. 
Furthermore, the new statute includes 
more stringent control mechanisms 
on the use of French subsidies by the 
local government in order to prevent 
embezzlement, corruption, and bad 
governance (NT, 20 Sept 2007; TPM, 
Oct and Dec 2008).
On 4 October, the assembly held 
a nonbinding vote on the proposal, 
and rejected it with an overwhelm-
ing majority; upld and Tahoeraa 
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denounced it as interference in the 
country’s autonomy, and as remi-
niscent of colonialism. However, 
when Temaru met Sarkozy in Paris 
a few days later, on 9 October, he 
was informed that early elections in 
January under the new system were 
a done deal (TPM, Nov 2007). In 
spite of overwhelming local opposi-
tion, the reform was rushed through 
the French parliament.  It passed the 
National Assembly on 22 November 
and the Senate on 30 November, with 
votes from Sarkozy’s ump (Union 
for a Popular Movement) and allied 
right-wing parties prevailing over the 
 opposition French Socialist party (TPM, 
Dec 2008). This episode proved once 
more that the statute of autonomy 
does not guarantee real local self-
government, as France remains able 
to make arbitrary modifi cations to its 
political system against the explicit 
will of the local assembly.
It was only logical, therefore, that 
at the Pacifi c Islands Forum meeting 
in Nuku‘alofa, Tonga, on 15 Octo-
ber, President Temaru reiterated the 
demand to reinscribe French Polynesia 
on the UN list of non-self-governing 
territories, from which France had 
removed the territory unilaterally in 
1947 (TPM, Nov 2007; July 2008).
Political corruption is a pressing 
issue, now affecting every politi-
cal camp. Efforts to fi ght it through 
political and judicial means have been 
largely ineffective. On 12 October, 
Jean-Paul Barral, the new Temaru 
appointee at the head of the Post and 
Telecommunications Offi ce, drasti-
cally cut his own salary and removed 
all additional benefi ts associated with 
the position. Previous offi ceholders, 
especially those under the ministry 
of Emile Vernaudon in the fi rst two 
Temaru governments, had grossly 
abused these privileges and embezzled 
large amounts of funds, a scandal that 
provoked massive public criticism 
(TPM, Nov 2007). 
On 29 November, a Papeete court 
confi rmed the sentences of 23 individ-
uals including former President Flosse 
for embezzlement of public funds 
through the creation of so-called “fi c-
tional employments,” ruling that they 
needed to reimburse a total of 308 
million cfp francs (us$3.5 million) of 
fraudulently received salaries, in addi-
tion to fi nes (TPM, Dec 2007). 
The most spectacular effort by the 
local judiciary in the prosecution of 
corruption was the arrest of Emile 
Vernaudon on 4 December for his role 
in the post offi ce embezzlement scan-
dal. In sharp contrast to the previous 
lenient treatment of corrupt politi-
cians, Vernaudon was placed in deten-
tion for the following four months 
until completion of the judicial inquiry 
(TPM, Jan 2007). 
The specter of outer-island seces-
sion also reemerged. On 31 October, 
the mayor of Hiva Oa in the Mar-
quesas, Guy Rauzy, and his colleague 
Teina Maraeura of Rangiroa in the 
Tuamotus suggested to Secretary of 
State Estrosi that their respective 
archipelagos should remain French 
territories in the event of Tahiti’s 
independence (TPM, Dec 2007). 
During the Marquesas Islands festi-
val on 17 December, which Estrosi 
attended, Mayor Joseph Kaiha of the 
Marquesas island of Ua Pou publicly 
demanded the creation of a separate 
French overseas entity for the Mar-
quesas. This led to strong and polemic 
reactions from Temaru and Flosse, 
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who accused Kaiha and Estrosi of 
attempting to dismantle the territo-
rial integrity of the country. A protest 
march called by Temaru’s party on 22 
December attracted 1,200 participants 
in downtown Papeete (TPM, Jan 2008). 
The idea of Marquesan secession has 
existed in local political debates for 
decades, but it had never sparked such 
passionate reactions.
The focus on the country’s unity 
was probably a result of the electoral 
campaign of December and January. 
While President Temaru attempted 
to revive the popular support for 
change that had brought him to power 
in 2004 and 2005, and focused on 
denouncing ongoing French colonial-
ism, Tong Sang claimed to be the only 
competent and reasonable politician 
capable of reunifying the population 
and working constructively with Paris. 
Flosse, on the other hand, distanced 
himself from Temaru and stressed his 
pro-French ideology, while denounc-
ing Tong Sang as an imposter and 
emphasizing the long period of politi-
cal stability under his previous term 
in offi ce from 1991 to 2004 (TPM, Jan 
and Feb 2008). 
The two election rounds, on 27 
January and 10 February, brought a 
surprising development as Tong Sang’s 
recently formed alliance of splinter 
parties won a relative majority in both 
of them. In the fi rst ballot, To Tatou 
Ai‘a, including allied party lists on 
the Tuamotu and Marquesas islands, 
achieved 36.52 percent of the vote, 
considerably more than the upld with 
32.83 percent, while Tahoeraa with 
21.82 percent came far behind. Nicole 
Bouteau’s small No Oe E Te Nunaa 
(For You, People) party—the only 
one that had constantly upheld its 
high moral standards and that did not 
participate in power plays—reached 
the fourth position with 5.40 percent, 
and was thus the only minor party 
qualifi ed for an eventual merger with 
one of the three leading lists. Ten other 
lists received less than 1 percent each 
(TP, 28 Jan 2008). 
During the campaign, and even 
more so between the two election 
rounds, the actions and attitude 
of Secretary of State Estrosi were 
strongly criticized. Over a period of 
several months preceding the election, 
Estrosi visited Tahiti unusually often, 
each time demonstrating a conspicu-
ously positive attitude toward Tong 
Sang. Immediately after the fi rst 
election round, Estrosi telephoned 
Nicole Bouteau and Gaston Flosse, 
and advised them to merge with Tong 
Sang’s list for the second ballot. Bou-
teau refused and expressed her indig-
nation at the secretary’s interference 
in the electoral process, preferring to 
uphold her dignity and leave active 
politics for the time being (TPM, Feb 
2008). Flosse also refused, so the three 
leading lists went unchanged into the 
runoff. At the same time, the leader-
ship of the ruling French ump party 
congratulated Estrosi for the “suc-
cessful carrying out of the election,” 
reinforcing the impression that he 
had interfered in the election process 
in Tong Sang’s favor. Both Flosse and 
Temaru expressed their indignation, 
and Temaru subsequently fi led a legal 
complaint against Estrosi (TPM, Feb 
2008). 
The results of the runoff ballot 
reinforced the tendencies apparent in 
the fi rst round. To Tatou Ai‘a received 
45.12 percent and gained 27 of the 57 
seats in the assembly, two short of the 
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overall majority. upld received 37.18 
percent of the votes and 20 seats, 
whereas Tahoeraa fell further behind, 
gaining only 17.16 percent and 10 
seats.
To Tatou Ai‘a’s lists led the ballot in 
four of the six electoral constituencies. 
In the traditional Tahoeraa strong-
hold of Pirae, To Tatou Ai‘a gained 
an absolute majority of votes. upld 
was the leading party in Temaru’s 
stronghold of Faa‘a, as well as in the 
Tahoeraa-ruled municipalities of Paea, 
Papara, Moorea, and Taputapuatea, 
and in the constituency of the Eastern 
Tuamotu islands. Tahoeraa, on the 
other hand, which had lead the vote 
in most of the outer islands in the last 
elections in 2004, achieved a majority 
only in the Austral Islands constitu-
ency (NT, 11 Feb 2008; DT, 11 Feb 
2008). 
In spite of Tong Sang’s surpris-
ing success, no party held an overall 
majority in the assembly, necessitating 
the formation of a governing coali-
tion. Estrosi once more attempted to 
interfere in the election process by 
calling on Flosse to ally with Tong 
Sang, an action which suggested that 
Paris wanted to remove Temaru from 
the presidency at all cost (DT, 11 Feb 
2008). 
Tong Sang and Fritch subsequently 
began negotiations to form a coalition, 
but these failed because of Tahoeraa’s 
excessive demands. Flosse then negoti-
ated with Temaru, but the talks were 
suspended when Tong Sang declared 
he would fulfi ll all of Flosse’s requests. 
According to their coalition agree-
ment, Fritch was reelected Speaker 
of the assembly with the votes of To 
Tatou Ai‘a and Tahoeraa in the consti-
tuting session on 22 February. In the 
second session on 23 February, how-
ever, during which Tong Sang was sup-
posed to be elected president, Flosse 
made yet another unexpected move. 
The night before he had suspended 
the ongoing talks with Tong Sang, and 
instead made an agreement to form 
a governing coalition with upld. At 
the last minute, Temaru withdrew 
his candidacy, and Flosse was elected 
president with a bare majority of the 
combined 29 votes of Tahoeraa and 
upld against the 27 votes for Tong 
Sang. One unknown representative 
had abstained. Assembly Speaker 
Fritch subsequently resigned, and 
Temaru was elected on 29 February 
to replace him. As another part of the 
deal, upld and Tahoeraa formed a 
common parliamentary caucus called 
udsp (Union for Development, Stabil-
ity and Peace), which enabled them 
to obtain the leading positions in the 
assembly’s administration and on 
the various committees (TPM, March 
2008).
In his inaugural speech, Flosse said 
it was time to stop the ideological 
debate between independence sup-
porters and autonomists (in local 
politics, the autonomists are consid-
ered pro-French), and form instead a 
government of unity in order to work 
for the future of the country. As the 
most experienced of the three leaders, 
he claimed to be the most suitable to 
lead the coalition and act as arbiter 
between the two opposing factions of 
To Tatou Ai‘a and upld (TP, 23 Feb 
2008). 
Temaru argued that Flosse was 
the lesser of two evils, considering it 
more important to prevent the elec-
tion of Tong Sang, who he regards as a 
French puppet. The latter, on the other 
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hand, vehemently refused Flosse’s 
offer to participate in the government, 
and many To Tatou Ai‘a members and 
supporters were outraged at what they 
perceived as a distortion of the elec-
tion results and thus a defrauding of 
the voters. On 1 March, a large pro-
test march was organized by To Tatou 
Ai‘a in downtown Papeete, rallying 
about 9,000 people (TPM, March and 
April 2008). However, the protestors 
seemed to forget that French Polyne-
sia has a parliamentary, rather than 
a presidential system, and a relative 
majority of seats does not guarantee a 
party the right to hold the presidency. 
Secretary of State Estrosi refused 
to congratulate Flosse and merely 
“took notice” of his presidency. A 
spokesperson of the ump party, of 
which Flosse has been a member for 
decades, announced it would break 
off all offi cial contacts with Tahoeraa, 
which used to be the ump’s local affi li-
ate. He accused Flosse of betraying the 
ideals of ump by forming an alliance 
“against nature” (TP, 24 Feb 2008). 
On 28 February, President Flosse 
presented his cabinet, consisting of 15 
ministers—5 from Tahoeraa, includ-
ing Edouard Fritch as vice president, 
and 10 from upld, primarily those 
who served in Flosse’s and Temaru’s 
previous cabinets. An exception was 
Temaru’s daughter Teua Temaru, a 
young marine biologist with no previ-
ous political experience, who became 
minister of environment (TP, 28 Feb 
2008). 
Analyzing the election results and 
their aftermath and comparing them 
with those of 2004 (outer islands) 
and 2005 (by-election on Tahiti and 
Moorea), one can make the following 
observations. The upld lost a con-
siderable amount of support, as many 
voters became disappointed with the 
performance of Temaru’s governments, 
which failed to suffi ciently implement 
their electoral platform of good gov-
ernance and social justice. A decisive 
element for the upld’s loss of a major-
ity was also the defection of Emile 
Vernaudon’s Ai‘a Api party, originally 
the second-largest component of the 
upld, to Tong Sang’s party. The core 
element of upld, Temaru’s pro-inde-
pendence Tavini Huiraatira (People’s 
Servant) party, on the other hand, 
remains comparatively strong. 
Most remarkable was Tong Sang’s 
performance and his ability to gain 
a relative majority when his party 
had been in existence for only a few 
months. He successfully presented 
himself as the embodiment of renewal 
and good governance, despite the fact 
that he had been a cabinet minister 
under Flosse for many years and was 
under judicial inquiry because of his 
involvement in a corruption affair in 
the early 2000s. In addition, many of 
his allies are suspected of corruption, 
or regarded as notorious opportun-
ists. One explanation for his electoral 
 success was that many voters felt 
insecure because of France’s uncoop-
erative attitude toward the Temaru 
governments, and longed for political 
stability and a secure fl ow of fi nancial 
subsidies from Paris. This made them 
feel compelled to vote for the candi-
date favored by Paris. Also important 
were the massive number of votes cast 
for Tong Sang by the steadily growing 
number of French settlers, as well as 
those of the economically infl uential 
Chinese community, of which Tong 
Sang is a part. 
The demise of the once all-powerful 
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Tahoeraa can be explained through 
the party’s split following the quarrel 
between Flosse and Tong Sang. An 
important section of the former Taho-
eraa electorate, including the French 
settlers, the Chinese community, and 
the Polynesian upper class, almost 
completely defected to Tong Sang, 
an observation clearly confi rmed by 
Tong Sang’s absolute majorities in all 
upper-class suburban neighborhoods. 
Apart from a few individuals from 
these social classes who are personally 
tied to Flosse, Tahoeraa only retains 
hold on its core electorate among the 
rural and working-class Polynesian 
population, which tends to be critical 
of France. Since Temaru’s core elector-
ate comes from the same social class, 
the political alliance of the two leaders 
is not as illogical as it might seem at 
fi rst glance. 
Electoral campaigning was far from 
over, however. On 9 and 16 March, 
municipal elections took place, which 
largely confi rmed the tendencies of the 
preceding territorial elections. Unsur-
prisingly, Oscar Temaru was reelected 
with an overall majority in the fi rst 
round as mayor of Faa‘a, the country’s 
largest municipality, a position he has 
held since 1983. In a similar land-
slide, Gaston Tong Sang was reelected 
mayor of the island of Bora Bora. 
President Flosse’s Tahoeraa, on the 
other hand, suffered further defeats. 
In the party’s former stronghold of 
Pirae, Edouard Fritch lost the mayor-
alty to Beatrice Vernaudon (To Tatou 
Ai‘a), and in the third largest township 
of Punaauia, long-serving Tahoeraa 
mayor Jacques Vii was defeated by 
another Tong Sang supporter, Rony 
Tumahai. In Papeete, the capital and 
second largest city, Mayor Michel 
Buillard was reelected, but only after 
having switched his allegiance from 
Tahoeraa to To Tatou Ai‘a. In the 
township of Mahina, the long-serving, 
now Tong Sang–allied Mayor Emile 
Vernaudon, was reelected in absentia, 
since he was detained on embezzle-
ment charges throughout the electoral 
campaign (TP, 10, 17 March). 
On the outer islands, the picture 
was less clear, with many lists refl ect-
ing local issues more than Papeete pol-
itics. Two of Tong Sang’s allies most 
notorious for their frequent change of 
allegiance, Marcellin Lisan of Huahine 
and Temauri Foster of Hao in the Tua-
motus, lost their mayoralties to local 
alliances between Tahoeraa and upld 
(TP, 17, 22 March 2008). 
After the municipal elections, politi-
cal agitation calmed down a little, 
and the new government was able to 
deliver its fi rst major achievement. On 
19 March, the udsp majority in the 
assembly adopted the 2008 budget of 
161.29 billion cfp francs (us$2.03 
billion), which had been originally 
introduced by Temaru’s government in 
December 2007 but was then vetoed 
by Tahoeraa. 
Another example of the construc-
tive policy of the udsp alliance was 
the nuclear issue. The government-
affi liated Orientation Council on 
the Follow-up on Nuclear Testing 
(coscen) was maintained by the 
Flosse government. In early March 
it met with the French government’s 
delegate on nuclear safety, Jurien de 
la Gravière, to coordinate the cleanup 
of military sites on the islands and 
atolls surrounding the former testing 
ground. While visiting Mangareva, 
one of the islands targeted for cleanup, 
de la Gravière, along with a coscen 
160 the contemporary pacifi c • 21:1 (2009)
delegation, supervised the deconstruc-
tion of a 1960s antinuclear shelter, 
the material of which will be used to 
seal parts of the island’s road (TP, 2, 3 
April 2008). He promised also to help 
in the restoration and maintenance of 
Mangareva’s St Michael’s Cathedral, 
the oldest and largest nineteenth-cen-
tury Catholic church building in the 
Pacifi c. The cathedral is a historic 
monument that has fallen into disre-
pair and is threatened with collapse 
(TP, 5 April 2008). A few weeks after 
de la Gravière’s visit, the territorial 
health offi ce announced a series of 
missions to examine and supervise 
the health of former test workers and 
inhabitants exposed to radiation (21 
March 2008). 
Even though electoral campaign-
ing was defi nitely over, a new twist in 
the political drama began to unfold 
in early April. Michel Yip and Justine 
Teura, two upld assembly representa-
tives from the outer islands, resigned 
from the udsp caucus and allied them-
selves with a group of outer-island 
representatives of To Tatou Ai‘a, who 
had previously formed a third parlia-
mentary caucus named Te Mana o te 
Motu (The Power of the Islands). This 
was apparently a tactical maneuver in 
order to make Yip’s and Teura’s fl oor 
crossing appear less extreme (TP, 8 
April 2008). Shortly after the forma-
tion of the new caucus, Tong Sang 
and his supporters fi led a motion of 
defi ance against Flosse (TP, 10 April 
2008). 
At fi rst Temaru and Flosse appeared 
little impressed, and the next day they 
presented a declaration underlining 
the commitment to their coalition 
government with a detailed govern-
ing platform (TP, 11 Apr 2008). In the 
 following session of the assembly on 
15 April, however, the motion of defi -
ance was passed with a bare majority 
of 29 votes against 27 and 1 absten-
tion. After less than two months in 
offi ce, the Flosse government had been 
overthrown and Tong Sang was once 
again president (TP, 15 April 2008). 
In his inaugural speech, the new 
president emphasized that his elec-
tion fi nally took into account the 
popular election results of February, 
and promised to pursue an impartial 
and citizen-oriented form of gover-
nance. Flosse and Temaru, on the 
other hand, questioned the legitimacy 
of the change of government because 
it was the result of representatives’ 
fl oor-crossing. 
The French government demon-
strated once more its partisan support 
for Tong Sang, as President Sarkozy 
and other French government offi cials 
congratulated the new Polynesian 
president immediately after his elec-
tion. Two months before, Flosse had 
not received any such congratulations 
from Paris (TPM, May 2008). 
On 19 April, Tong Sang announced 
his cabinet, composed of 14 ministers, 
most of them unchanged from those 
in his cabinet in 2007. Jules Ienfa 
became the new vice president (TP, 19 
Apr 2008). Interestingly, Teva Huiotu-
Hapaitahaa, son-in-law of Michel 
Yip, became minister of pearl farm-
ing and interisland communications, 
and Justine Teura’s daughter Ottine 
Teura obtained the portfolio of outer-
island development. This reinforced 
the impression that the two turncoat 
representatives were “bought” by 
promising them ministerial portfo-
lios for their family members (TP, 19 
Apr 2008). Tong Sang also convinced 
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Tahoeraa representative Armelle 
 Merceron to join the cabinet as 
minister of solidarity and housing. In 
addition, he offered a fi fteenth cabinet 
position to a member of upld, but 
this was declined (TPM, May 2008).
The latest change of government 
demonstrated that the chronic politi-
cal instability continues despite the 
political reforms intended to end it. 
Since 2004, the country has seen only 
bare majorities, and an ever-increasing 
number of politicians have adopted 
an opportunist pattern of behavior, 
whereby they join whichever party is 
most likely to form the majority. 
Only eleven days after his inaugura-
tion, Tong Sang reshuffl ed his cabinet, 
appointing Louis Frébault as minis-
ter for development planning after 
his wife, a To Tatou Ai‘a assembly 
member from the Marquesas islands, 
had threatened to cross the fl oor. Two 
weeks later, To Tatou Ai‘a representa-
tive Fernand Roomataroa from the 
Austral Islands was appointed min-
ister of agriculture, after he criticized 
Tong Sang and threatened defection to 
Tahoeraa (pir, 16 May 2008). 
Despite his promises of good 
governance, President Tong Sang’s 
administration has thus followed the 
patterns of opportunism and nepotism 
that have become typical of all local 
governments. Another example is the 
Offi ce of Postal Services and Tele-
communications, where Tong Sang 
resumed the deplorable practice of 
replacing existing offi cers with politi-
cal cronies. The honest and effi cient 
Jean-Paul Barral, maintained in offi ce 
under Flosse, was removed by Tong 
Sang on 9 May and replaced as direc-
tor by Jean-Christophe Bouissou’s 
associate Moana Blanchard, who had 
previously left a poor record as admin-
istrator of another territorial agency 
(TPM, June 2008). In June, the daugh-
ter of Hiro Tefaarere—a To Tatou Ai‘a 
representative notorious for his erratic 
switches of allegiance—was appointed 
to a minor position at the post offi ce, 
after her father had threatened another 
fl oor-crossing (TPM, July 2008).
The political unrest continued 
throughout the month of May, 
 taking the form of a constant quar-
rel between Tong Sang’s government 
and the udsp opposition. When the 
government submitted a series of 
contracts of fi nancial assistance and 
cooperation that were to be signed 
with the French government and sub-
mitted to the assembly for approval 
on 6 May, Speaker Temaru refused to 
open the session, deferring it instead 
to a date after the president’s planned 
trip to Paris. A subsequent attempt 
by the To Tatou Ai‘a caucus members 
to hold their own assembly session in 
another building was declared invalid 
by the French High Commission (TP, 
7 May 2008). The contracts were 
eventually approved, while Tong Sang 
was already in Paris, and signed by 
President Sarkozy on 27 May. The 
two presidents spoke of “turning the 
pages” toward a new era of transpar-
ency and cooperation between Paris 
and Papeete, denouncing “ancient 
practices” that had been detrimental 
to the country’s image (TPM, June 
2008). This was quite ironic, as Tong 
Sang and his supporters have partici-
pated in these “ancient practices” just 
as much as their adversaries. While 
promising a stricter scrutiny of the 
French government over the local 
government’s fi nances, the signed 
contracts essentially renewed French 
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subsidies for various local businesses 
and government agencies. A real, sub-
stantial difference from the practices 
of previous administrations remains to 
be seen. 
Meanwhile, all indicators showed 
that the country’s economy was not 
performing well. The tourism  sector 
continued to decline, and many territo-
rial services did not function well, due 
to constant changes of staff positions 
depending on the current governments 
in offi ce. These effects can be ulti-
mately linked to the country’s political 
instability, which is deplored by all 
sectors (TPM, May and June 2008). 
On 29 June, the territorial holiday 
commemorating the enactment of the 
1984 statute of internal autonomy, 
as well as the annexation of Tahiti by 
France in 1880, was celebrated by the 
presidency with great pomp. During 
the evening of the controversial holi-
day, Temaru and his supporters held 
their traditional ceremony at a monu-
ment in Faa‘a to honor Tahitian sol-
diers who fell during the resistance to 
French colonization in the 1840s. This 
year, Gaston Flosse, who had briefl y 
attended parts of the autonomy cel-
ebrations in the morning, participated 
in the Faa‘a ceremony for the fi rst 
time. He laid a wreath and spoke in 
honor of Polynesian resistance against 
France, including on his home island 
of Mangareva. He called for a greater, 
more visible monument to be built 
(TP, 30 June 2008). Since for decades 
Flosse had denounced the monument 
and Temaru’s commemorations as 
anti-French propaganda, his shift in 
attitude once more caused widespread 
consternation (TPM, Aug 2008). 
lorenz gonschor
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In the latter part of 2007, relations 
between Mäori and the New Zealand 
government came close to the break-
ing point. A raid carried out by a 
New Zealand Police armed defenders 
squad in full combat gear trauma-
tized a small Mäori community in the 
central North Island on 15 October, 
just weeks after the NZ government 
had joined Australia, Canada, and the 
United States to vote against the adop-
tion of a United Nations declaration 
on indigenous rights. The raid coin-
cided with the release of a government 
report showing that almost 20 percent 
of Mäori currently live in Australia. 
Many had left New Zealand for  better 
economic opportunities, but also 
“to escape the perceived prejudice of 
Päkehä (New Zealanders of European 
descent) and mainstream negativity 
about Mäori issues” (Hamer 2007, 
14). Yet by mid-2008, with polls indi-
cating the likelihood of a change of 
government in the upcoming general 
election, Mäori started reaping the 
benefi ts of a government desperate for 
our support, particularly in settling 
Mäori land claims. 
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On 15 October 2007, the fi rst 
reports of early morning police raids 
around the country started appear-
ing, as environmental and Mäori 
sovereignty activists were targeted for 
alleged terrorist activities. Both the 
commissioner of police and the prime 
minister had been briefed prior to the 
raids, several of which involved single 
households in urban areas where there 
was minimal disturbance to neigh-
bors and the wider community. But 
in Ruatoki, a small, remote Mäori 
community in the Urewera Ranges 
located in the heart of Tühoe tribal 
territory, the media reported a massive 
police presence. The Mäori Party later 
reported that seventy armed police 
were in Ruatoki that morning when 
three people were arrested (Mäori 
Party 2007a). A roadblock was set up 
on the only road out of the commu-
nity, with people, cars, and a school 
bus being searched and photographed. 
Houses and property were inspected 
and some were damaged. Four rifl es 
and 230 rounds of ammunition were 
seized. Many people were detained 
and transported to Rotorua, only to 
be subsequently released to fi nd their 
own way home. The whole com-
munity was traumatized, including 
preschool children, who referred to 
the black-clad, helmeted, gun-carrying 
paramilitary police who boarded their 
school bus as “the ninja army” (Mäori 
Party 2007b). 
Ruatoki is the home of the well-
known Mäori rights campaigner and 
activist, Tama Iti. He was one of the 
seventeen people from around the 
country arrested and charged under 
the Firearms Act, and one of six held 
in custody while the police tried to 
gather evidence to justify charges 
under the 2002 Terrorism Suppres-
sion Act. According to police, those 
arrested had been running terrorist 
training camps in the very remote 
Urewera Ranges. However, the Mäori 
media quickly identifi ed the so-called 
“training camps” as camping sites 
used by local hunters. According to 
media reports, the evidence police 
appeared to have relied on was mainly 
recordings of conversations, including 
telephone conversations, texts, and e-
mails. Eventually, the solicitor general 
refused to allow terrorism charges 
to be laid and the six people held in 
custody were released on bail.
In Parliament, the Labour minor-
ity government’s Mäori members 
remained silent, claiming it was a 
police matter (NZH, 29 Oct 2007). 
The Mäori Party, however, bitterly 
attacked the police and the govern-
ment for violating the community 
of Ruatoki and leaving the Tühoe 
people traumatized. Mäori Party mp 
Hone Harawira drew particularly 
strong personal criticism and abuse 
from Päkehä for speaking out against 
the police actions. He responded by 
issuing a press release citing the full 
text of his attack in Parliament and 
refusing to back down (Mäori Party 
2007c). His claim that his statement 
accurately refl ected the feeling in 
many Mäori communities around the 
country was supported by the results 
of a survey showing a high level of 
concern about the raids among Mäori 
participants (Mäori Party 2007d). In 
his statement he said, “I will not sit 
quietly by, while State forces terrorise 
my people. If this requires of me that 
I speak out against the rule of law 
that would impose terror on Mäori 
communities in this country, then I 
164 the contemporary pacifi c • 21:1 (2009)
will speak out. I will speak out against 
it in this chamber, on television, in 
newspapers, and anywhere else I 
possibly can” (Mäori Party 2007c). 
Nationwide protests followed. The 
human rights commissioner received 
offi cial complaints, as did the United 
Nations human rights committee who 
asked the New Zealand government 
for an explanation. In November, the 
police commissioner conceded that 
the raids had badly damaged relations 
with Tühoe, which could take decades 
to heal (NZH, 9 Nov 2007). In March 
2008, he acknowledged and expressed 
regret over the hurt caused (NZH, 30 
March 2008).
One month before the raids, the 
Mäori Party had launched a blister-
ing attack on the government for 
voting against the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples (UN 2007). It had been 
adopted by the UN General Assembly 
on 13 September 2007 by an over-
whelming majority of 143 to 4. The 
four states who voted against it—the 
United States, Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand—all share a history of 
British colonization, which has left the 
indigenous peoples of those countries 
marginalized, deprived, and oppressed 
minorities in their own lands, stripped 
of their lands and natural resources, 
denied sovereignty, and subjected to 
racism and discrimination. The dec-
laration, in its forty-fi ve articles, sets 
out the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous peoples: the 
rights to self-determination, cultures, 
traditions, languages, institutions, 
worldviews, and ways of life. It calls 
on states to prevent and redress theft 
of land and natural resources, and 
forced assimilation, while establishing 
minimal standards to eliminate the 
racism, discrimination, marginaliza-
tion, and exploitation that inhibits the 
development of indigenous peoples.
Mäori had been involved in the 
drafting of the declaration from the 
outset, in the early 1980s. One of the 
reasons the document took so long 
to formulate was that the four states 
who voted against it had consistently 
impeded its progress, thereby drawing 
widespread condemnation from the 
global indigenous community. None 
of the opposing countries consulted 
properly with the indigenous peoples 
they claimed to represent. In addi-
tion, they did not want the injustices 
suffered by those peoples scrutinized, 
nor did they want it known that cur-
rent legal ownership of lands by states 
and nonindigenous individuals derives 
from an initial theft (Taonui 2007). 
The declaration urges that land be 
returned where possible, but where it 
is not possible it recommends compen-
sation at full value. In New Zealand, 
Mäori have been forced to accept very 
much less, calculated to be an aver-
age of 0.06 percent of losses (Mutu 
2004, 201). The New Zealand govern-
ment does not want to admit that its 
processes of providing restitution are 
unfair and unjust.
The adoption of the declaration 
by the United Nations received scant 
attention in mainstream media in New 
Zealand, and the government tried 
to play down its importance. How-
ever, Mäori Party mp Hone Harawira 
toured the North Island delivering 
seminars on it. The New Zealand 
Human Rights Commission issued 
a statement saying the contents of 
the declaration would guide its work 
(nzhrc 2007). With the change of 
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government in Australia in November 
2007, the Australian Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission 
announced that the new government 
supported the declaration (ahreoc 
[2007]). And by April 2008, news 
from Canada’s indigenous peoples 
indicated that the Canadian Parlia-
ment now also supported it (Assembly 
of First Nations 2008). With New 
Zealand becoming more isolated in its 
stance, a change in the government’s 
attitude toward Mäori, particularly 
with respect to its loathed Treaty of 
Waitangi claims settlement policy and 
process, became more inevitable.
In March and again in June 2007, 
the Waitangi Tribunal issued reports 
severely critical of the government’s 
settlement policy and process (Wai-
tangi Tribunal 2007a, 2007b). When 
the government ignored them, the 
Federation of Mäori Authorities and 
the New Zealand Mäori Council pur-
sued the matter through the courts. At 
the same time, iwi (tribal groupings) in 
various parts of the country continued 
with the repossession of lands the gov-
ernment refused to return to them and 
was trying to sell off (Mutu 2008). 
In April 2007 the government had 
delayed the sale of some of the blocks 
for three months. It announced in 
September that several had been with-
drawn from sale for four years. But 
the government was unable to gain 
suffi cient support in the House to pass 
several of its proposed settlements 
into law. In September the minister 
of Mäori affairs was ridiculed when 
he tabled the fi rst report in twelve 
years outlining the progress of suc-
cessive governments in implementing 
the recommendations of the Waitangi 
Tribunal with respect to Mäori Treaty 
of Waitangi claims against the Crown. 
Of the 48 reports disseminated by the 
tribunal, only 12 had issues addressed 
or implemented, and it was unclear 
what had happened to the rest (Ben-
nion 2007 [Sept], 8). 
Finally, in October, the deputy 
prime minister and minister of fi nance 
took over the portfolio for Treaty of 
Waitangi negotiations. Almost imme-
diately, direct negotiations between 
claimants and the Crown took on a 
sudden urgency as the meanness of 
spirit and bad faith on the part of the 
government that had plagued negotia-
tions for more than a decade appeared 
to be set aside. In the Central North 
Island, where the Waitangi Tribunal 
issued the fi rst two parts of a seven-
part report on the largest inquiry it 
had made to date (Waitangi Tribu-
nal 2008), eight iwi came together 
to develop their own solution for 
the settlement of their claims to the 
176,000 hectares of land under the 
eight Central North Island forests. The 
forests include the country’s largest 
exotic forest, Kaingaroa. They pre-
sented their proposal for the return of 
the forestlands and related assets in 
April 2008, and reached agreement 
with the government in May. The deal 
was promoted as being worth nz$419 
million, implying that the govern-
ment was far exceeding the previous 
largest payouts of nz$170 million 
each for the Tainui fi sheries and Ngäi 
Tahu settlements. Yet nz$223 mil-
lion of the nz$419 million was made 
up of accumulated rentals from the 
forests. The rentals belong to the 
iwi, not the Crown, as a result of the 
tribunal upholding their claims to the 
forestlands. The remaining nz$196 
million is the value the Crown has 
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put on the 176,000 hectares of land 
under the forests. The amount of land 
being returned is proportionally larger 
than has been achieved elsewhere in 
the country, but it is being returned 
already encumbered. In purely mon-
etary terms, the settlements of each 
for the eight iwi are on par with other 
treaty settlements, and as such still 
do not amount to fair, reasonable, or 
just recompense for all the violations 
they have  suffered at the hands of the 
Crown. Yet one of the iwi involved, 
Te Arawa of the Bay of Plenty, was 
able to use the deal to improve its 
own proposed settlement signifi cantly, 
including no longer having to pay for 
geothermal wells and fi ve school prop-
erties (Mana 2008 [Aug], 16–17).
In the Bay of Plenty, the mountain 
Mauao, also known as Mt Maun-
ganui, was fi nally returned to its right-
ful owners in May 2008. However, 
in a sleight of hand that amazed legal 
observers, the government managed to 
retain the mountain’s historic reserve 
status, and the minister of conserva-
tion continues to have all the rights 
and obligations of a freehold owner 
(Bennion 2008 [May], 4).
In the Far North, Ngäti Kahu had 
returned to the tribunal to seek orders 
for the return of 5,095 hectares of 
state-owned lands and forests after 
negotiations failed and they repos-
sessed the 3,711-hectare Rangiputa 
station to stop the government selling 
it. In April 2008, the tribunal gave 
the government three months to 
make an offer that was acceptable to 
Ngäti Kahu. For the fi rst time ever, 
the Crown apologized to Ngäti Kahu, 
and intensive negotiations with a chief 
negotiator appointed by the minister 
followed. Crown policy for settling 
treaty claims was largely abandoned. 
Instead, the negotiations focused on 
the social, economic, and spiritual 
needs and mana whenua (traditional 
sovereign authority, power, and 
control) considerations of the fi fteen 
hapü (grouping of extended families) 
and their associated marae (tradi-
tional venue for gatherings of the local 
tribal group), which make up Ngäti 
Kahu. By the end of June, the Crown 
made an offer that broke a lot of new 
ground in terms of treaty settlements. 
It involved the return of the control 
of more than 10,000 hectares of land 
to Ngäti Kahu, with fee-simple title 
to more than half of it, including 
Rangiputa station. The rest will come 
under the control of a statutory board 
made up of equal Ngäti Kahu/Crown 
membership, chaired by Ngäti Kahu, 
and with all its business conducted 
according to Ngäti Kahu customary 
law. The offer also included a cash 
contribution of nz$7.5 million to 
be used to rebuild the fi fteen marae 
and their associated housing, which 
are currently either nonexistent or 
in a very poor state of repair. Ngäti 
Kahu is in the process of drawing up 
an agreement in principle with the 
government, which they are planning 
to sign in early September, before the 
general election.
During the year we lost several 
Mäori icons who had made huge 
contributions to the well-being of 
their people. In September, Sid Jack-
son passed away. He was a prominent 
Mäori leader who had conducted 
a lifelong campaign for justice for 
Mäori, with a totally unswerving 
commitment to revolution and freeing 
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Mäori from the oppression of Brit-
ish immigrants. Later that month, 
Anglican Archbishop Whakahuihui 
Vercoe passed away; he was a priest 
for fi fty-four years and former bishop 
of Aotearoa. In his address at Wait-
angi for the commemoration of the 
150th anniversary of the signing of 
the Treaty of Waitangi, he told Queen 
Elizabeth II that Mäori were marginal-
ized in their own land. 
In January 2008, we lost a tower-
ing literary fi gure: poet, and author, 
Hone Tuwhare. He wrote the fi rst 
book of poetry by a Mäori author in 
English, and will be remembered as 
a great  artist and philosopher whose 
real talent was his simplicity. Then, 
one month later, it was Barry Barclay. 
He was a leading light in the world of 
indigenous fi lmmaking, having been 
the fi rst Mäori to direct a feature fi lm. 
Barclay made a number of documen-
taries and was a fi erce advocate 
against injustice, particularly what he 
saw as racism against Mäori in the 
fi lm industry and barriers to telling 
Mäori stories (Mana 2008 [Aug], 17). 
He was also a dedicated writer and 
had most recently published Mana 
Tüturu: Mäori Treasures and Intellec-
tual Property Rights (Barclay 2005).
There were also commemorations 
for the arrests thirty years ago of Eva 
Rickard and sixteen others at  Raglan 
for trespassing on their ancestral 
lands, which had been taken and used 
as an airfi eld during World War II. 
The lands had then been given to 
the local golf club and it wasn’t 
until much later that were eventu-
ally returned to the rightful owners. 
The 1978 arrests of 222 people at 
Takaparawhau (also known as Bas-
tion Point) were also commemorated. 
Those lands were also returned, 
although not until 1987.
It was the third year in a row that 
peaceful commemorations had been 
held at Waitangi on Waitangi Day, 
although the prime minister, fearing 
a backlash over the terror raids on 
Tühoe, refused to attend the formal 
ceremonies. The peaceful commem-
orations at Waitangi are largely 
attributed to the Mäori Party presence 
in Parliament and the role they have 
played as the independent Mäori voice 
unafraid to bring Mäori issues to the 
attention of the House and the nation.
However, the highlight of the 
Mäori year was the award of the 
Victoria Cross to Corporal Willie 
Apiata in July 2007. This was the 
fi rst time the award has been made 
to a living Mäori; the two previous 
awards were posthumous. There has 
been a great deal of bitterness among 
Mäori servicemen that many Mäori 
who should have been given Victoria 
Crosses, especially during World War 
II, did not receive them, even though 
returned servicemen and their families 
pursued it for more than fi fty years. 
Corporal Apiata received his Victo-
ria Cross for valor in Afghanistan in 
2004 for saving the life of a comrade 
while under heavy fi re from opposing 
forces. Huge hui (traditional gather-
ings) to celebrate the award were held 
at Te Kaha on the East Coast and at 
Waitangi. In April 2008, in a gesture 
of remarkable generosity, and to mark 
anzac Day, he gifted his Victoria 
Cross to the nation. In Mäori we say, 
he mahi tino rangatira, a most noble 
and selfl ess deed.
margaret mutu
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Rapa Nui
Politics on Rapa Nui during the 
review period focused mainly on the 
organic law bill for the future special 
administrative status of the island. 
The bill was subject to continuous 
debates, until being fi nally introduced 
in Congress in a watered-down ver-
sion. On the local political scene, the 
established politicians are clearing the 
way for a new generation of leader-
ship, some very reluctantly, others 
more freely.
The process of replacing the politi-
cal elite started in early June 2007, 
when pro-independence opposition 
leaders Mario Tuki and Raúl Teao 
won the highest numbers of votes 
in the elections to the Easter Island 
Development Commission (Gonschor 
2008, 242). This electoral success 
boosted the ambitions of the opposi-
tion leaders, and their next campaign 
aimed at unseating veteran community 
leader Alberto Hotus from the presi-
dency of the Council of Elders. Hotus, 
who is politically affi liated with the 
Chilean ruling center-left coalition, 
claims to hold the presidency of the 
council for life, even though this claim 
has never been universally accepted 
and has been an issue dividing the 
community for the last two decades. 
The dissidents subsequently called 
for an election of the council’s presi-
dency, which was held in late August 
in semi-offi cial fashion in a Hanga 
Roa school building. The three can-
didates were Mario Tuki, Leviante 
Araki, and Agterama Huki, all of 
whom are known for their pro-inde-
pendence position and their bitter 
opposition to Hotus. The election 
was won by Tuki, but only a minor-
ity of about 200 voters participated. 
Alberto Hotus refused to participate 
or even acknowledge the election. 
When  Chilean President Michelle 
Bachelet visited Rapa Nui for the 
annual ceremony commemorating the 
1888 annexation of the island on 9 
September, she was greeted by Hotus, 
presenting himself as the president of 
the Council of Elders. However, Tuki 
protested and tried to interrupt Hotus, 
arguing that it was he, Tuki, who was 
in fact the legitimate president follow-
ing the  election (trn, undated article 
circa Sept 2007). 
Many observers questioned the 
purpose of the election. In fact, neither 
Hotus’s nor Tuki’s interpretations is 
in line with the original purpose of 
the Council of Elders, which was to 
consist of the eldest representative 
of each family name existing on the 
island. These family representatives 
would then elect one among them as 
president. There is no basis for claim-
ing the presidency for life, nor does it 
make sense to elect the president by 
popular vote. Furthermore, the posi-
tion of president should not be that 
important in relation to the whole 
council, which is supposed to be a col-
lective organ, representing each family. 
Shifting the focus to the presidency is 
thus a manipulation for political pur-
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poses and a distortion of the council’s 
intended function. 
While factional political struggles 
continued with less intensity, the 
reform process of the island’s politi-
cal status was also slowly progressing. 
A constitutional reform to create the 
category of “special territories” out-
side the normal Chilean administrative 
system was passed on 5 June 2007 
after being stalled in Congress for two 
years. President Bachelet signed the 
reform into law on 27 July, clearing 
the way for an organic law to specify a 
system of administration for the island 
(Gonschor 2008, 242). However, the 
process of drafting that bill was far 
from complete. 
Over a period of several months 
during 2006, community workshops 
had produced a draft bill that was 
presented to the public in January 
2007. This draft bill, which was exten-
sively analyzed in last year’s review 
(Gonschor 2008), proposed an island 
administration headed by a Santiago-
appointed governor and a locally 
elected council with strong powers of 
control. It reserved both governorship 
and council membership to ethnic 
Rapanui. It also created a commission 
appointed by the Council of Elders 
to take over the management of all 
public lands from Chilean govern-
ment agencies (Government of Chile 
2007a). At the time of my visit to the 
governor’s offi ce in July 2007, Gov-
ernor Carolina Hotu still considered 
this draft to be the basis for the fi nal 
bill (Hotu, pers comm, 17 July 2007). 
But earlier, in a 28 February letter to 
Claudia Serrano, the undersecretary 
for regional development and admin-
istration, Mayor Petero Edmunds had 
complained about the community 
draft, arguing that the proposal was 
anathema to the national unity of 
Chile and also racially discrimina-
tory because of the reservation of key 
offi ces for native Rapanui (Edmunds 
2007). This move by the mayor—criti-
cizing the draft from a pro-Chilean 
perspective—came as quite a surprise. 
In two interviews given to Chilean and 
Argentinean journalists in December 
2006 and January 2007, Edmunds had 
advocated a diametrically opposed 
position—one that was radically 
autonomist if not pro-independence—
calling for the island to be decolonized 
and freed from Chilean rule (El Ojo 
Digital, 26 Jan 2007; trn, Nov 2007). 
The mayor’s vehement opposition to 
the community draft was probably 
due to the prominent participation 
of the local opposition in its making. 
He felt that his status as mayor was 
not properly acknowledged, as he 
explained in a later interview (trn, 27 
May 2007).
Although President Bachelet con-
fi rmed her approval of the special stat-
ute bill during her visit on 9 September 
(Noticias Correa, 9 Sept 2007), and 
there were rumors that the bill would 
be introduced in Congress before the 
end of the year, nothing happened for 
a long period. Apparently the Chilean 
government took the mayor’s objec-
tions seriously, and another draft bill, 
prepared by the Ministry of Interior, 
was released in September 2007. In 
contrast to the community draft, the 
ministry’s version contained no offi ces 
reserved for ethnic Rapanui; replaced 
the name “Rapa Nui” with “Easter 
Island”; increased the power of San-
tiago-appointed offi cials in relation to 
locally elected institutions; and deleted 
the paragraphs pertaining to the 
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reorganization of land tenure (Govern-
ment of Chile 2007b). 
With the two strongly different 
versions circulating, endless discus-
sions on the fi nal draft followed. On 
17 December, Undersecretary Ser-
rano visited the island and met with 
Governor Hotu, Mayor Edmunds, 
Hotus from the Council of Elders, and 
the fi ve elected members of the Easter 
Island Development Commission to 
discuss the new version of the bill and 
win their approval for it (subdere, 
17 Dec 2007). However, in contrast 
to the undersecretary’s visit in 2006, 
there was no community participation 
in the meeting. 
In the months following Serrano’s 
return to Chile, no visible action 
took place regarding the bill. Public 
attention focused once more on the 
local political scene. Mayor Edmunds 
continued to attract attention with 
contradictory statements and erratic 
moves, such as his sudden shift from 
an anticolonial to a pro-Chilean posi-
tion the previous year. Edmunds and 
the intendente (regional administra-
tor) of Valparaíso region, Ivan de la 
Maza, had a strong falling out in June 
2007, accusing each other of bro-
ken promises and inaction (RNJ, Oct 
2007, 165). In early 2008 Valparaíso 
regional councilor Enzo Muñoz wrote 
a letter of complaint about the mayor’s 
lack of performance (trn, undated 
article). In May, Edmunds announced 
that he would not seek reelection in 
the municipal elections scheduled for 
October 2008. This was later con-
fi rmed by the Christian Democratic 
Party of Chile, of which Edmunds 
used to be the local candidate. The 
party endorsed Luz Zasso Paoa, the 
only female member of the Easter 
Island Development Commission, as 
their new candidate for the mayoralty 
(trn, undated article).
Edmunds’s outspokenness also cre-
ated uproar on another  occasion. On 
26 March 2008, Finnish  tourist Marko 
Kulju broke off the ear of a moai 
(megalithic statue), a crime for which 
he was arrested, fi ned us$15,750 
and banned from Rapa Nui for three 
years. The mayor  publicly stated that 
one of Kulju’s ears should be cut off as 
an appropriate punishment (RNJ, May 
2008, 77; trn, March 2008).
The occasional vandalism exem-
plifi ed in Kulju’s case is only one of 
the problems intensifying with the 
growth of mass tourism. The num-
ber of visitors, presently estimated at 
about 50,000 annually, is increasing 
by 20 percent every year, a develop-
ment that causes not only satisfaction 
but also increasing concern among the 
Islanders. During the review period, 
a new luxury hotel named Posada 
Mike Rapu opened its doors, and 
several more are being planned. Edgar 
 Hereveri, president of the island’s 
Chamber of Tourism, expressed con-
cerns that the appropriate infrastruc-
ture is lacking to accommodate more 
visitors and warned that the island 
had collapsed once before—referring 
to the collapse of ancient Rapanui 
culture in the seventeenth or eigh-
teenth century due to overpopulation 
and depletion of resources (RNJ, May 
2008, 76–77). 
As a result of the tourism boom, 
and the accompanying mass infl ux 
of migrants from Chile, observers see 
the cultural heritage of the island as 
increasingly endangered. While some 
Islanders are very defensive about their 
cultural identity, others are becoming 
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increasingly westernized. Confronted 
by a mix of ideas from Chile, the 
United States, and other Polynesian 
islands, the Rapanui “cannot agree 
on whether they should follow in the 
footsteps of Tikopia or Las Vegas,” 
as one critical voice put it (Shawn Mc 
Laughlin, in RNJ, May 2008, 67). 
In December 2007, the island tragi-
cally lost one of the bearers of hope 
for the future of its heritage, when 
Clemente Hereveri passed away at age 
thirty-two. Hereveri was one of the 
most profi cient experts of Rapanui 
language, culture, and oral history 
among the younger generation. He 
had studied archaeology in Chile, 
served as the secretary of the recently 
formed Rapanui Language Academy, 
and worked for the defense of indig-
enous rights throughout Chile. He 
was also a leading participant in the 
discussions about the special statute 
bill (RNJ, May 2008, 79). 
Toward the end of the review 
period, the issue of Rapa Nui’s status 
came up again. From 5 to 6 May 
2008, a Chilean government del-
egation visited the island in order to 
pre sent the latest government draft 
version of the bill. They discussed it 
with local political leaders in Gover-
nor Hotu’s offi ce, to prepare for its 
impending introduction in Congress. 
During the meeting, participants made 
proposals for modifi cations and in 
the end agreed on a list of additions 
to perfect the bill (subdere, 12 May 
2008). On 4 June, the bill was fi nally 
completed and sent by President 
Bachelet to the Chamber of Deputies 
(Government of Chile 2008), where 
it was formally introduced on 2 July 
(subdere, 3 July 2008). 
The current bill, more similar to the 
Ministry of Interior draft than to the 
community draft, can be summarized 
as follows: The current province of 
Easter Island, subject to the Valpa-
raíso region, will be abolished and 
replaced with the Special Territory of 
Easter Island, directly dependent on 
the central government in Santiago, 
and no longer part of any region. The 
insular administration will be headed 
by an island governor, appointed by 
the Chilean president, with preroga-
tives similar to a regional intendente 
(articles 2–3). Qualifi cations for the 
island governorship include two 
years of residency in the territory 
prior to appointment (article 4), but 
do not include Rapanui ancestry or 
knowledge of the Rapanui language, 
as in the 2007 community draft. All 
government agencies on the island, 
both those of the insular administra-
tion and those depending on metro-
politan Chilean government depart-
ments, will be under the authority of 
the governor (articles 13–23; 37–39). 
The island governor will be assisted 
by, and preside ex offi cio over, an 
Island Development Council consist-
ing of six elected members, four of 
whom must be ethnic Rapanui; the 
president of the Council of Elders will 
also serve as an ex-offi cio member, 
along with the mayor, who has a right 
to speak but not vote (articles 24–29, 
48–49). The council’s main preroga-
tives will be budgetary appropriations 
and confi rmation of votes on projects 
proposed by the governor (articles 21, 
30, 43, 46). In contrast to the provi-
sions of the 2007 community draft, 
the council will have no powers to 
initiate the governor’s removal from 
offi ce or to confi rm his appointments 
of civil  servants. The presently exist-
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ing municipality, with the elected 
mayor and six councilors, will remain 
structurally unchanged, but it will be 
dependent on the island governor’s 
offi ce instead of the Valparaíso 
regional administration. However, its 
administrative responsibilities will be 
increased (article 67). 
Special attention is given to the 
protection of the Rapanui identity and 
cultural heritage, which the governor 
has an obligation to protect (articles 
1, 11, 15a). The Council of Elders 
is recognized as a legitimate local 
institution with advisory powers in 
all matters pertaining to Rapanui 
culture and language (articles 51–52). 
Furthermore, the bill creates a Rapa 
Nui Lands Commission, to be formed 
in place of the present Easter Island 
Development Commission, which will 
be disbanded (article 76). Composed 
of the governor (who will preside ex 
offi cio), fi ve elected ethnic Rapanui 
councilors, the president of the Coun-
cil of Elders, a representative of the 
Chilean Ministry of Public Lands, and 
the local representative of the Chilean 
Offi ce for Indigenous Development, 
the Rapa Nui Lands Commission will 
supervise the administration and use 
of Chilean state-controlled lands and 
coordinate grants of land title to Rapa 
Nui families (articles 53–58).
In conclusion, it is worth  noting 
that while the 2007 community 
draft was already a compromise 
between Rapanui calls for autonomy 
and Chilean claims of centralized 
authority, the 2008 bill represents an 
extremely watered-down version of 
the original proposals for a genuine 
statute of autonomy made by Mayor 
Edmunds and others in 2002–2003 
(RNJ, Oct 2003, 150). As such, the bill 
is not likely to either solve the island’s 
administrative problems or satisfy the 
Rapanui’s demands for autonomy. The 
bill severs ties with Valparaíso region 
and places the island directly under 
Santiago, but the relationship between 
the island community and the Chil-
ean-appointed government apparatus 
remains essentially the same. With 
the powerful chief executive still 
appointed rather than locally elected, 
it is diffi cult to see the statute as one 
of internal autonomy. In addition, 
the bill increases rather than reduces 
bureaucracy, by creating new institu-
tions but failing to abolish existing 
ones. The continuing existence of two 
parallel administrations—the munici-
pality and the governor’s offi ce, each 
with its own elected council, execu-
tive head, and numerous supporting 
staff—seems absurd for a community 
consisting of only one settlement with 
a few thousand inhabitants. 
One must wonder why the island 
cannot follow the example of all other 
dependent but internally autonomous 
Pacifi c Islands territories such as 
French Polynesia, American Sämoa, 
Norfolk Island, or Tokelau. Each of 
these territories has a local govern-
ment consisting of an elected assembly 
and an elected chief executive, respon-
sible for all local affairs, while the 
metropolitan executive government 
is represented by a high commission 
(French Territories), administrator 
(New Zealand and Australian terri-
tories), or a federal offi ce (US ter-
ritories) to administer its sovereign 
prerogatives. A similar arrangement 
was advocated for Rapa Nui in one 
of the earlier draft proposals (Hacia 
un  Estatuto de Autonomía para Isla 
de Pascua [2003]), but apparently no 
174 the contemporary pacifi c • 21:1 (2009)
Chilean legislator even took up this 
idea. With no elected local chief execu-
tive in existence to represent the island 
internationally, it seems that Chile, 
despite all the apparently liberalizing 
measures of the last few years, is still 
determined to prevent Rapa Nui from 
taking its rightful place in the Pacifi c 
region as, at the very least, an inter-
nally self-governing political entity. 
Finally, the bill says nothing about 
controlling immigration to the island, 
and the issue was not taken up dur-
ing its preparation, even though this 
was one of the most important points 
of concern raised in the 2006–2007 
workshops. The immigration issue had 
therefore been included in the commu-
nity draft as another piece of legisla-
tion to be prepared in parallel. If the 
Chilean government is really commit-
ted to the “preservation of the identity 
of the Rapanui people” as it states in 
article 11 of the bill, something must 
be done soon to stop the uncontrolled 
infl ux of Chilean settlers that as of a 
few years ago had already turned the 
Rapanui into a minority on their own 
island. 
In summary, if the present bill 
passes, it will certainly count as a 
fi rst step in the right direction. But in 
order to create a meaningful autono-
mous government that can address the 
island’s long-term needs, much more 
substantial political reform will be 
necessary in the near future. 
lorenz gonschor 
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Sa¯moa
During the year in review, the Human 
Rights Protection Party (hrpp) 
maintained its dominance over the 
 unoffi cial minority parties. However, 
the introduction of several controver-
sial policies led to some fragmentation 
of the party following the defection 
of two hrpp stalwarts. With the 
breakup of the Samoa Development 
United Party (sdup) the previous 
year, there was no offi cial opposition 
party in the Samoan Parliament, so 
effective opposition to government 
measures was missing. The year may 
be described as one where the Human 
Rights Protection Party, principally 
through its leader, the effervescent 
Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malie-
legaoi, attempted to test the limits 
of its political power. The result was 
the emergence of people power, but 
will that be enough to halt the hrpp 
juggernaut?
The most controversial issue, 
which has led to some fragmentation 
in the hrpp political machinery, was 
the adoption of a policy that banned 
left-hand-drive motor vehicles, and 
changed the side of the road on which 
traffi c travels from the right to the left. 
Horse carriages and motor vehicles 
have been driven on the right-hand 
side of the road in Sämoa since 1899, 
so it was a shock when the country 
learned in early September 2007 that 
the Tuilaepa government was draft-
ing a bill to change that. Perhaps it 
was not so much the policy itself that 
prompted public opposition, but the 
manner in which it was introduced: 
There was no consultation with stake-
holders, no proper scientifi c study 
to determine the effects of such a 
change, rejection of expert opinion by 
the Chamber of Commerce and the 
Institute of Professional Engineers, 
Samoa (ipes), and inattentiveness to 
public opinion. In other words, there 
was a perceived lack of transparency 
and accountability in the formulation 
of the new government policy, leading 
to charges of recklessness and pos-
sible underhanded dealings. Public 
accusations against the prime minister 
over the issue were simply laughed 
off, which made public relations even 
worse.
The reason the prime minister gave 
to the Samoa Observer for implement-
ing the policy was the need to align 
with neighboring countries, namely 
New Zealand and Australia (SO, 18 
Sept 2007). Of course, it was only the 
fi rst shot fi red in a propaganda war 
that pitted the prime minister and 
his Human Rights Protection Party 
against some of the most powerful 
civic forces in the country—a war 
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that was to last the better part of a 
year. Never has an issue dominated 
the  editorial section of the Samoa 
Observer for so long, with the great 
majority of letter writers opposed to 
the switch. In response, the govern-
ment used its own newspaper, the 
Savali, and the government-owned 
sbc tv and sbc Radio to counter the 
arguments of its opponents. 
The immediate reaction to the 
announcement came from the Samoa 
Rental Car Association, which 
opposed the switch. There was no 
doubt in the mind of the association 
president that such a change would 
have dire consequences for the car-
rental business in Sämoa, the belief 
being that tourists would feel uncom-
fortable because they were used to 
driving on the right side of the road. 
The switch would also pose a major 
problem to the association’s members, 
because all their new vehicles are left-
hand drive. Above all the association 
condemned the government’s failure 
to consult with stakeholders (SO, 19 
Sept 2007). Other areas of concern to 
the association were the high cost of 
conversions (which could amount to 
millions), potential lawsuits, death, 
and compensation. 
The next round of opposition came 
from a group of nongovernmental 
organizations (ngos) made up of the 
Samoa Chamber of Commerce, the 
Samoa Umbrella of Non-Government 
Organizations (sungo), the Samoa 
Association of Manufacturers and 
Exporters, Women in Business, and 
the Taxi Association of Samoa. These 
organizations argued that the switch 
would cause enormous hardship 
to all Samoans, and they expressed 
concern about the potential for more 
car accidents and serious injuries; the 
high cost of changing infrastructure 
(roads, signage, traffi c lights, etc); and 
the environmental impact of scrapped 
left-hand-drive cars. They estimated 
that the total cost to the economy 
would be at least 790 million Samoan 
tala (SO, 5 Nov 2007). (Currently, one 
Samoan tala [sat$] equals approxi-
mately us$0.38.) The nongovernmen-
tal organizations called on the prime 
minister to withdraw the decision, to 
engage in a process of public consulta-
tion, to release any reports that had 
informed the government’s decision, 
and to establish a commission to look 
into the issue. Another prominent 
opponent, the Institute of Professional 
Engineers, Samoa, warned that the 
switch could cost the country one 
billion tala, a fi gure approaching the 
entire gross domestic product (SO, 
16 Dec 2007). Representatives of the 
Samoan insurance industry also asked 
the government to properly research 
the social and economic impact of 
the switch, indicating that it would 
take years before the proportion of 
left-hand-drive vehicles on the roads 
would diminish signifi cantly. 
The prime minister and his ardent 
supporters were just as vociferous 
in their announcements in public 
and through the government-owned 
media. In an interview with Savali 
(SO, 11 Nov 2007), Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa dismissed all the opponents’ 
concerns as trivial or based on incor-
rect assumptions. His primary justifi -
cations were saving energy by doing 
away with gas-guzzling American 
cars, and helping ordinary people 
whose families live in Australia and 
New Zealand acquire affordable 
cars from those countries. A week 
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after Tuilaepa’s Savali interview, 
Minister of Works, Transport and 
Infrastructure Tuisugaletaua Sofara 
Aveau announced that the cabinet had 
approved the new policy, opening the 
way for drafting the legislation and 
parliamentary discussion. Moreover, 
the government had estimated the cost 
of the switch to be sat$5 million and 
called the ngo estimate “way out of 
kilter.” Addressing safety concerns, the 
minister noted that the government 
planned to implement a driver-train-
ing program for those who needed it, 
and that bus stops and one-way streets 
might be introduced in the city. He 
also rejected any suggestion that the 
road switch had to do with economic 
pressures from Sämoa’s overseas devel-
opment partners and donor agencies. 
Shortly after the minister’s 
announcement, a citizen’s group 
called the People Against Switching 
Sides (pass) emerged, with prominent 
lawyer Toleafoa Solomona Toailoa as 
convener and later chairman. Toailoa 
called a public meeting on 30 Novem-
ber 2007 to discuss the issue. Toleafoa 
said that the issue should have been 
put to the public fi rst, and that he 
had decided to take action only after 
seeing all the letters to the editor and 
hearing people’s complaints. The 
swiftness of the government’s action 
also gave the appearance that the deci-
sion was a fait accompli. Toleafoa had 
called the meeting, he said, on his own 
initiative and was not doing it because 
he was against the prime minister. He 
also asked politicians to not attend the 
meeting so that they could not use it 
for their own political purposes. The 
crucial issue, Toleafoa explained, was 
that the public was not convinced by 
the government’s arguments for the 
switch, and that the claim that the 
change would cost only sat$5 mil-
lion “just shows how silly that sort of 
statement is as it lacked any basis.” 
Key decisions require consulting the 
public, he added, and not doing so 
runs counter to the culture and demo-
cratic ideals on which Samoan society 
is based (SO, 27 Nov 2007).
Hundreds turned up to the meet-
ing, and it was decided to hold a 
protest march to Parliament. On 17 
December, an estimated 15,000 people 
marched, and Speaker Tolofuaivalelei 
Falemoe Leiataua adjourned Parlia-
ment to enable the prime minister 
and members to meet them. Toleafoa 
presented a petition with more than 
33,000 signatures to the Speaker. The 
Speaker said the petition would be 
presented to Parliament that day, but 
reminded the marchers that the legisla-
tion had not yet been tabled in Parlia-
ment, and that the petition could not 
be considered until it was (SO, 18 Dec 
2007). The next day, the pass petition 
was tabled in Parliament, along with 
a second petition from the Institute of 
Professional Engineers, Samoa.
Parliament appointed four govern-
ment members and three indepen-
dents to form a petitions committee. 
Toleafoa warned that if the petition 
did not receive a favorable reception, 
he would resort to legal options. He 
promised that the measure would 
not become law. However, the pass 
rhetoric fell on deaf ears. On 10 
March 2008, the petitions commit-
tee tabled a nineteen-page report in 
Parliament. The report recommended 
that the government carefully consider 
the concerns of the petitioners, but 
reminded members that they represent 
their constituencies and are authorized 
178 the contemporary pacifi c • 21:1 (2009)
to make laws for the benefi t of the 
country. They also noted that the cost 
estimates by the petitioners confl icted 
with those of the government (SO, 11 
March 2008). While the pass mem-
bership responded with shock, its 
chairman, Toleafoa, was not surprised. 
He described the report as a farce, 
since four members of the committee 
represented the hrpp majority and 
only three represented the unoffi cial 
minority parties, independents, and 
the Samoa Development United Party. 
While the committee sought the views 
of the nation, these views were not 
refl ected in the report, Toleafoa said. 
The pass group did not remain idle 
while the Road Transport Reform Bill 
worked its way through Parliament. It 
carried out a second protest march on 
14 April 2008, when Parliament was 
scheduled to reconvene to discuss the 
bill. The estimated number of people 
who joined the march was higher 
than before (18,000 this time), caus-
ing Toleafoa to declare that the great 
majority of the population was against 
the switch (SO, 15 April 2008). Never-
theless, the bill was eventually passed 
on 18 April 2008. The legislation puts 
an end to the importation of left-hand-
drive vehicles (as of 2 May 2008), and 
drivers will be required to travel on 
the left side of the road beginning in 
the second half of 2009.
pass chair Toleafoa said the day 
the Road Transport Reform Bill was 
passed would be remembered as Black 
Friday, a day when the government 
ignored the voice of the people to pass 
a law that would cost lives and cripple 
the economy. Citing unconstitution-
ality, in March the pass group fi led 
a legal action in the Supreme Court 
against the bill. 
The government’s intransigence 
over the traffi c issue led directly 
to the later resignation of two key 
hrpp members, Safata mp Palusalue 
Faapo II and Aleipata Itu I Lalo mp 
Muagututia Siaosi Meredith. A third 
hrpp associate minister, Hans Joachim 
Keil, opposed and voted against the 
right-hand-drive bill, but chose to 
remain with the party. Keil, one of two 
representatives of the Individual Vot-
ers’ Roll, said his constituency opposed 
the switch and pointed out some major 
shortcomings in the petitions commit-
tee report. Palusalue also stated that 
his constituency opposed the switch, 
and that the Human Rights Protection 
Party had failed to take into account 
its immediate impact. He predicted 
that there would be deaths on the road 
as a result. Muagututia said that as a 
member of the Institute of Professional 
Engineers, Samoa, he supported the 
ipes position and was disappointed 
that the report of the petitions com-
mittee did not adequately address the 
problems of cost and safety. That only 
two hrpp members defected from 
the party as a result of these events is 
certainly a credit to the management 
skills of the prime minister. There was 
no mass exodus, as some critics of the 
bill had hoped.
Another major consequence of the 
road transport reform issue was the 
formation of a new political party 
made up of those members of Parlia-
ment who opposed the switch, includ-
ing the independents, members of the 
Samoa Development United Party, and 
the two members who defected from 
the Human Rights Protection Party. 
Lealailepule Rimoni Aiafi , the chair-
man, said the party was formed due 
to the immediate need for a strong 
pol i t ical reviews • polynesia 179
parliamentary opposition, and to 
gain power in the 2011 general elec-
tions. But despite having the requisite 
numbers (fourteen), the new party 
cannot yet be recognized in Parliament 
because, according to the Standing 
Orders of Parliament, registration of 
members and the formation of a new 
party can only take place after a gen-
eral election and before a new Parlia-
ment is formed.
The second major issue that con-
fronted the governing Human Rights 
Protection Party during the year under 
review was the Land Titles Registra-
tion Bill 2007. The bill was controver-
sial from the start due to the provision 
that ownership of customary land 
must be registered under the name of a 
family chief. Traditionally, ownership 
of Samoan customary land was vested 
in the primary heirs (suli tau toto) of 
a title, which means a family corpora-
tion. For any major activity requiring 
the use of a family’s customary land, 
all the primary heirs had to be con-
sulted for their approval. Under the 
new bill, ownership would be vested in 
the name of individual matai (chiefs) 
and not under the title representing the 
family corporation. As  critics of the 
bill have argued, this means that the 
named chief could will the land to his 
own descendants, begging the ques-
tion: What about the property rights 
of the other heirs, such as those con-
nected through collateral lines? 
When the bill came up for discus-
sion in Parliament, Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa said that passing the bill 
would in no way affect rights over 
customary land. Such rights, he 
stressed, were already in the Samoan 
constitution and hrpp members were 
well aware of the need to protect 
them. What the bill would do, he 
went on, is provide for registration of 
freehold land. (There is much uncer-
tainty in the ownership of freehold 
land under the current deeds system, 
even if a person holds a deed to con-
fi rm ownership). The prime minister 
pointed out that the bill introduces the 
Torrens system for registering freehold 
land—under which ownership would 
be more secure—and only deals with 
customary land with regard to leasing 
it. If a person or a business defaults in 
repayment of a loan, the bank is not 
authorized to take customary land 
as compensation. Instead it can only 
take over the lease of a person who 
defaults on repayments, and advertise 
for another person to continue the 
lease. In his comments, however, the 
prime minister did not address the 
main question relating to registration 
of customary land under the name of 
an individual chief.
The sungo chairperson, Vaasilii-
fi ti Moelagi Jackson, said that Land 
Registration Bill 2008 was unconsti-
tutional, unethical, and un-Samoan. 
She reasoned that customary land 
in Sämoa is not private; holders of 
matai titles are trustees, not owners, of 
Samoan customary lands; and matai 
titles, not individual chiefs, are vested 
with proprietorship of such lands. 
Therefore, private property registra-
tion systems cannot be applied in prin-
ciple or practice to Samoan customary 
land, unless there is consensus from all 
of the heirs (SO, 10 March 2008).
Sua Rimoni Ah Chong, leader of 
the Samoa Party, said the registration 
of customary land under any matai’s 
own name would signal the death 
of the fa‘a-Sämoa because it would 
transfer authority over customary 
180 the contemporary pacifi c • 21:1 (2009)
land from a group title to that of an 
individual. This was inconsistent with 
article 102 of the Samoan constitu-
tion, and if the prime minister wanted 
to change the constitution, then it 
would have to be done properly (SO, 
18 May 2008). 
The government appointed the Task 
Force on the Economic Use of Cus-
tomary Land, which visited villages 
around the main islands of ‘Upolu and 
Savai‘i to canvass people’s views about 
the bill. A member of the task force, 
Masinalupe Tusipa, chief executive 
offi cer of the Justice Ministry, said it 
was not the function of the committee 
to explain the contents of the Land 
Titles Registration Bill but rather to 
obtain the views of the country regard-
ing the leasing of customary land, to 
explain that leasing of customary land 
was not new, and to counsel people 
about where to obtain help if they 
wanted to lease their land.
Despite widespread opposition to 
the bill, the government approved it 
on 13 June 2008 under its new title, 
the Land Act 2008. True leasing of 
customary land for development has 
been in the law books for at least 
thirty years, yet there has been very 
little sign of any extra boost to agri-
cultural development. It remains to be 
seen how successful this act will be in 
fulfi lling the government’s intentions 
of promoting development through 
the use of idle customary land. 
Asiata Saleimoa Va‘ai, leader of 
the unrecognized Samoa Development 
United Party, believes the Land Act 
resulted from pressure by aid donor 
countries and international fi nancial 
institutions. This is also the popu-
lar view among the public. Like the 
right-hand-drive legislation, the Land 
Act may return to haunt the Human 
Rights Protection Party in the next 
general election.
The government has also been 
 grappling with other land issues. Due 
to land-related grievences, the people 
of Satapuala village occupied govern-
ment land located opposite the Inter-
national Airport terminal at Faleolo. 
Violence was narrowly averted as a 
result of face-to-face meetings between 
the village matai and the prime min-
ister. The compromise reached was 
the formation of a joint committee 
made up of representatives from the 
village and the government to discuss 
concerns about boundaries, compensa-
tion, priorities in lease grants within 
the government’s proposed township 
at Faleolo, and so on.
A similar event occurred when 
persons from a village in the Siumu 
district occupied private land several 
miles inland. Again, the occupation 
had to do with grievances against the 
government over land matters. Even-
tually, the squatters were removed and 
charged by the police. The occupation 
was not as serious as the Satapuala 
situation, however, because most 
people in Siumu district were against 
the action of the squatters, preferring 
instead to continue their fi ght in the 
courts. 
Further, the government deci-
sion to relocate the inhabitants of 
Sogi village, just behind the Kitano 
Hotel, Apia, has led to resentment 
among the residents, who have been 
living there for generations. Eventu-
ally, Minister of Natural Resources 
and Environment Faumuina Tiatia 
Liuga told the thirty families involved 
that they had to  relocate from public 
land to an inland site at Falelauniu 
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because the government needed to 
protect the mangrove environment, 
prevent fl ooding, and accommodate 
population increases. Each family was 
entitled to one quarter acre of land at 
a reduced price, a generous repayment 
period without interest, a 15 percent 
discount if the entire amount is paid 
in one lump sum, and relocation costs 
of sat$3,000 per family (SO, 9 April 
2008). In addition, the government 
agreed to donate two and a half acres 
at Falelauniu to the Congregational 
Christian Church in return for its 
quarter-acre section at Sogi, and the 
Samoan Land Corporation would 
provide sat$100,000 for the construc-
tion of a new church and a residence 
for the pastor.
In July 2007, the Land and Titles 
Court declared invalid the bestowal 
of the Malietoa title on Papali‘i 
Fa‘amausili Moli, son of the late head 
of state, and ruled that the protocol 
of a court decision in 1939 must be 
followed in choosing a successor. The 
protocol applies to the three main lin-
eages (Malietoa Moli, Malietoa Natui-
tasina, and Malietoa Talavou) when 
they reach agreement on a candidate. 
However, some observers are of the 
opinion that it may take a long time 
for such a consensus to be reached.
The Electoral Committee, which 
was tasked to look into the Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the 2006 general elections, recom-
mended that the Individual Voters’ 
Roll be abolished before the 2011 
general election. It also recommended 
the prosecution of individuals who 
make bribery payments to others in 
order to infl uence them not to lodge, 
or to withdraw, an election petition, 
as well as those who extort money 
for the withdrawal of petitions. 
Finally it  recommended the creation 
of additional parliamentary seats for 
Vaimauga Sisifo and Faleata Sisifo, 
in keeping with population trends 
(SO, 13 Nov 2007).
Hans Joachim Keil, as current 
representative of the Individual  Voters’ 
Roll, argued that there is no need to 
legislate away the existence of the 
roll, as it will die a natural death. He 
pointed out that currently there are 
only two members, while previously 
there were fi ve. The number of people 
who qualify for the roll will gradually 
diminish, and the number of those 
who take on matai titles will increase. 
unasa l f va‘a
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